Shredding Pace-Finletter, the U.S. Army, and Close Air Support

The recent debate over the retirement of the A-10 Warthog and OH-58 Kiowa aircraft and helicopters respectively has sparked a very fervent debate over the future of the mission of close air support.[1] With the 2011 Budget Control Act still serving as a significant brake on U.S. military spending (with the Pentagon’s budget request coming to 3.24% of U.S. GDP), the cutting of both of these platforms is seen by the U.S. Air Force and Army as a sad but inevitable occurrence.[2] By detractors, however, both decisions are seen as hopelessly misguided ones, as they throw out the most effective (the Air Force) and most frequently used (Army) close air support assets.[3]

What this article will suggest, however, is that rather than splitting the mission of close air support (CAS) up by service, it may be a good idea to blend the efforts of the two services once more.[4] While this may not be a novel solution, it is one which may allow the U.S. military to retain a crucial, and importantly cost-effective, ability to support troops at the forward edge of the battle area. Before outlining why, however, the origins of the current split in close-air-support assets need to be explained.

Pace-Finletter MoU

The split in close-air-support asset types was first really delineated with the Pace-Finletter Memorandum of Understanding in 1952.[5] At a time when the USAF was still only five years old and when the Korean War was going on, both the U.S. Army and Air Force agreed to limit the size of U.S. Army fixed-wing strike aircraft to below 5,000 pounds in weight – deliberately precluding the opportunity for the Army to build up a capable fixed-wing CAS fleet.[6] This agreement was later built upon by the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966 which resolved the Air Force and Army to not command units of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft respectively.[7]

While these existing agreements limit the Army’s options, the general climate between the Air Force and the Army would suggest that they could probably be overwritten.[8] No longer is the Air Force struggling to forge an identity as a service branch, or fighting with the same ferocity for budget dollars with the other services; it does not “need” the close air support mission to justify its independence. However, to override previous arrangements most effectively, the agreement would simply need to lift the limits on U.S. Army procurement of fixed-wing attack aircraft. Doing so would give the Army the most flexibility in their effort to fulfill the close air support mission. Given that the Congressional support for the A-10 in part hinges on the fact that no replacement for that aircraft is planned, giving the Army a platform to carry out the close air support mission would alleviate Congress’ concerns.[9]

Given the idea’s feasibility, then the important question then becomes, “how should the U.S. Army go about filling the role of close air support?” To answer that question adequately, however, requires a thorough understanding of the close air support mission.

Close Air Support Currently

The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Publication “Joint Publication 3-09.3: Close Air Support” defines close air support as: “air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces, and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”[10] Colloquially, CAS has been described in a variety of ways, with “flying artillery” being a particularly apt one in this case. Historically, especially for fast-moving and mobile campaigns, aircraft have been used to provide fire support in place of artillery.[11] CAS is similar, though the versatility of aircraft (and their greater accuracy in many environments) means that a variety of different effects can be brought to bear against the enemy, from suppression fires, produced from cannon and machine guns,[12] to much larger precision fires such as 2,000lb Laser-Guided JDAM.[13] Most importantly, CAS is a mission most flown when air supremacy has been achieved. However, no matter the payload delivered, close-air-support-specific aircraft generally are designed around several principles; good visibility, slow speed, large amounts of aerodynamic lift, good loiter endurance at low altitude, the ability to deliver significant amounts of munitions and physical ruggedness.

Good visibility is important not only for pilots looking out of the cockpit but also for sensor pods (some are restricted by fixed landing gear, for example). Slow speed (or more specifically, low stall speed) is important especially for unguided munitions due to its effect on accuracy. The lower the speed of the aircraft, the higher the accuracy of the munitions on target. Lift is important because it allows for long loiter periods, but also maneuverability and turn capability, important for dodging missiles and getting inside enemy aircraft if need be.[14] Loiter endurance is important because of the ability it affords one to make multiple target passes, and to stay on station longer, lowering the number of aircraft one needs to devote to CAS, especially in a lower-threat environment.  Having significant amounts of combat ordnance on hand is useful for obvious reasons, namely because you can destroy more targets in a single sortie. Finally, physical ruggedness, both in terms of resistance to enemy fire and ability to operate from a variety of different areas in terms of runways, is crucial for operating as close as possible to friendly troops, affording quicker response time.

These characteristics are, as mentioned, particular to fixed-wing aircraft, and all are applicable to the A-10, especially when compared to other aircraft such as the F-16. However, given the plans to retire the A-10 the question of how to replicate these characteristics without this and other aircraft needs to be asked. In particular, it is worth asking the question of how one would replicate these characteristics without simply bringing these aircraft back from the Boneyard, or by designing something all-new.


Answering that above question will need to involve an assessment of potential options to fill the role of close-air-support aircraft. Given the current budgetary pressures, any replacement will have to be extremely cost-effective – which almost always means products that have already been developed. In particular, this analysis will look at three classes of aircraft; Armed Agricultural, Light Prop Attack and Light Attack (Jet). While these platforms are undoubtedly less sophisticated than the A-10, for instance, as CAS platforms they have their merits, and in many ways are far more sophisticated than the Army’s principal CAS platform, the OH-58 Kiowa.[16] Hence, examining the options class-by-class, we can come to an understanding of exactly what could replace existing capabilities – and also how much each would cost.

Armed Agricultural

Armed Agricultural aircraft are, in terms of sophistication, the least sophisticated class outlined here. As the name indicates, these aircraft are essentially crop-dusters modified for military use, which, initially, sounds like a fairly ridiculous replacement for dedicated CAS aircraft such as the A-10. However, compared to scout helicopters such as the OH-58 Kiowa, their characteristics would likely lend themselves fairly well to the CAS mission. Firstly, they are aircraft designed to spend life at very low altitude – which gives them large wings, and long endurance, even with heavy payloads. Secondly, they have a slow enough speed (and stall speed) to make them useful for delivering ordnance, while still possessing higher-than-helicopter dash speed enabling them to reach battlefields faster. Thirdly, they are rugged enough to operate from virtually any strip, road, uneven grass or pavement, which means that they are capable of operating close to quickly-moving frontlines. Finally, many of the Armed Agricultural aircraft on the market are equipped with long endurance, enabling them to loiter over target areas for a long period of time, in some cases, much longer than even the A-10.

Aircraft in this class include the Air Tractor AT-802U and the IOMAX Archangel (both pictured below) and are both capable of carrying far more ordnance than Kiowa helicopters (more than twice the number of .50 cal machine guns and rocket pods, while also carrying 500lb bombs).[17] Interestingly, they are also much cheaper to procure and operate, if not as operationally flexible. As seen in the chart below, procuring and operating a fleet of AT-802U Air Tractors (one of the leading aircraft in the class) instead of OH-58D Kiowas would be significantly cheaper based on verifiable cost data for the aircraft in question – though the scale of the cost differential is likely to be narrower in favor of the AT-802 for several reasons.

One, the aircraft’s low cost per flight hour has not been demonstrated in hostile environments where the existing fleet is required to conduct missions at a very high operational tempo, as have the Kiowas. The lower number of annual flight hours means that the real cost per flight hour of the AT-802 is several times higher than the quoted $400 per flight hour.

Secondly, it is unlikely that so many (825) Air Tractors would be procured due to the higher budgetary strain this would impose through necessitating the training maintainers and pilots. This is another reason that the operating cost per flight hour for the Air Tractor is likely to be higher, as the number of airframes procured is likely to be equal to – or lower than – the Kiowa.[18] That number of airframes would have to endure a higher operational tempo, which in terms of fuel and maintenance support, would drive up costs.

Finally, the relative inflexibility of the Air Tractor’s employment compared to the Kiowa, while the Air Tractor’s dollars will perhaps buy more effectiveness in the CAS and surveillance roles, it will not buy as effective overwatch capability or vertical take-off and hovering capability.[19] That being said, it is likely that the Air Tractor and other aircraft in the Armed Agricultural class still have a lower operating cost than the Kiowa, and would be, due to their low speed, and high munition loads, quite suitable for the CAS mission – especially compared to helicopters (frankly, of almost any type) in the CAS role.[20]

Figure 1: Air Tractor vs. OH-58D Kiowa procurement and operating costs[21]

Aircraft Type Airframe Cost ($k) Estimated Sensor Suite Cost($k) Fleet Size  Operating Cost per Flight Hour Annual Number of Flight-Hours Per Aircraft Annual Cost of Fleet Operation ($k) Total Cost of Fleet Ownership ($k) Total Number of Flight Hours(k)
OH-58D Kiowa  –  – 338 $2,931 1080 1,069,932 21,398,640 5,476
AT-802U Air Tractor $3,000 $3,000 825 $400 450 148,500 5,370,000 5,569


Figure 2: AT-802U Air Tractor


Figure 3: IOMAX Archangel Block 3


Light Prop Attack

Light Prop Attack aircraft, by contrast with Armed Agricultural aircraft, are more sophisticated aircraft. Aircraft of this class (for instance, such as the Beechcraft AT-6, Embraer Super Tucano, and KAI KA-1) are are faster, with top speeds of 300kts compared to 200kts,[22] built for a greater variety of missions, including air patrol,[23] and typically have more sophisticated avionics and sensor systems, allowing them to operate with a lower pilot workload and in denser weather conditions.[24]However, the cost of these aircraft is significantly higher – from $10 million for the KAI KT-1 to up to $20.8 million for the U.S.-manufactured Super Tucano.[25] However, their cost per flight hour is comparable to Armed Agricultural aircraft (~$1,000 per flight hour) and in some cases, they are capable of operating from unprepared airstrips.[26]

Their disadvantages, however, do exist. In addition to the cost, these aircraft, not being derived from crop-dusters, are not designed to spend their time at low altitudes, for one. Secondly, having retractable landing gear, they are not as rugged, especially with regard to takeoff and landing, as an Armed Agricultural aircraft is, an important consideration given the need to be near the frontline for higher responsiveness (though higher dash speed could potentially make up for this). Finally, due to the airframe being more optimized for speed, endurance suffers – even the Super Tucano, an aircraft with the highest endurance in-class, has only 6h 30min of endurance; not the 10 hours regularly achieved with Armed Agricultural aircraft.[27]

While proponents of the Light Prop Attack class will point to the fact that the ruggedness and endurance are sufficient for a variety of customers, their multi-mission capabilities, compared to those of Armed Agricultural airplanes, seem too well developed for the CAS mission. Granted, these aircraft are phenomenal performers in their own right, and would be a valued “low” component of a mixed-sophistication air force, allowing a cheap and readily deployable method of delivering bombs on target and carrying out light air defense. However, every aircraft ever designed is a compromise, and for the U.S. in particular, I believe it makes sense to argue that Armed Agricultural aircraft are a better fit because of their superior ruggedness, endurance, and lower operating costs. While they are not capable of carrying out light air defense missions, flexibility is ultimately not a crucial requirement for the CAS mission, and does little but add cost and complexity.

Figure 4: Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano


Figure 5: Beechcraft AT-6C


Figure 6: KAI KA-1

‘Buddy Wing’ wraps up at Osan

Light Attack (Jet)

In this final class, there is only one particular aircraft capable of being considered: the Textron AirLand Scorpion. Given the fact that this aircraft has not yet been delivered to its first customer, the cost projections may indeed be wildly inaccurate, laying to waste the crux of Textron’s business plan and the structure of this article. However, if this aircraft eventually does what it says “on the tin”, it would be a valuable platform, even for a USAF customer. The aircraft is stated to cost $20 million per platform, a cost which I seriously doubt would include training and support, and could be expected to be a significant amount higher, perhaps $28-30 million with everything included. The reported operating cost per flight hour is $3,000 – higher than Light Prop Attack aircraft, but still reasonable considering the operating cost per flight hour of an A-10 is $17,716 as of fiscal year 2013.[28] At this operating cost, and assuming the $8 million markup holds, buying and operating the Scorpion would be roughly half the cost of the A-10 for the rest of the A-10’s service life (13 years).[29] Granted, standing up a new platform would incur costs that do not factor into that consideration – but the magnitude of those costs is not likely to undermine this fundamental fact: that based on current estimates, the Scorpion is very cheap.

Figure 7: AirLand Scorpion, A-10 Procurement and Operating Costs[30]

Aircraft Type Airframe Cost ($k) Estimated Sensor Suite Cost($k) Fleet Size  Operating Cost per Flight Hour Annual Number of Flight-Hours Per Aircraft Annual Cost of Fleet Operation ($k) Total Cost of Fleet Ownership ($k) Total Number of Flight Hours(k)
Textron AirLand Scorpion 28,000,000 350 $3,000 300 315,000 13,895,000 105
A-10 350 $17,716 300 1,860,180 24,182,340 105


Figure 8: Textron AirLand Scorpion


Operationally, the aircraft is not purpose-built for close air support, a fact that the supporters of the A-10 are likely to allege is the reason why the Scorpion is not a “suitable replacement”. However, the Scorpion does have several strengths which play strongly into CAS duties. For one thing, unlike typical fast jets, the Scorpion has excellent endurance of up to 5 hours’ time on station. That is more than double the A-10’s endurance.[31] Secondly, it has a two-man crew, which the A-10 does not, better divvying up workload and freeing air planners from the necessity of operating aircraft in pairs, as A-10s frequently do.[32] Thirdly, the aircraft is capable of flying just as “low and slow” as the A-10 is, ensuring the accuracy of unguided weapons.[33]  The aircraft is not as resistant to small-arms and AAA fire, admittedly, but unlike the A-10 it is not burdened electrically by the need to operate a massive cannon, meaning that more sophisticated EW and radar / IR jamming equipment can be mounted onboard to improve survivability.[34] Plus the fact that it has a second seat means that this GIB[35] can more effectively operate these EW and IR jamming systems than on the A-10, given that pilot’s already high workload.

However, it is clear that the replacement of the A-10, if indeed it is to occur, is not going to be directly achieved with purchasing the Scorpion or a product like it. But if the U.S. Army were to replace its Kiowas with an Air Tractor or something comparable, it could massively increase its effectiveness in CAS roles and reduce the pressure on the Air Force’s existing CAS fleet. That then would open up the Air Force to procure the Scorpion (if it worked as advertised) to augment this capability. With the money saved by procuring the Scorpion, one could easily break off a segment of the Scorpion fleet (or even the entire 350-aircraft fleet itself) and dedicate it to close-air-support duty. This would mean that like the A-10, Scorpion pilots would be trained 24/7/365 to carry out close-air-support and nothing but it – a factor which is consistently underappreciated in why A-10 pilots are so successful at helping ground troops.

In short, while the retirement of the A-10 and the OH-58 Kiowa is a loss for the close air support capability of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, should budget caps be rescinded and investment opened up again, it would make sense for the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force to not stick to what is known – and procure new aircraft to carry out the close-air-support roles for both services. By procuring fixed-wing aircraft to deliver CAS for the Army, and more cost-effective ones to do so for the Air Force, the CAS mission will be well served.


[1] Here, “close air support” is defined as the delivery of aerial fires (bombs, missiles, cannon rounds, etc.) to the forward edge of the battle area.







[8] See, for instance the fact that, with the exception of a couple, most of the proponents for the A-10 have been either JTACs or USAF A-10 pilots, and not U.S. Army personnel (certainly not U.S. Army brass):, – “Odierno said he believed the Air Force would find the right mix of aircraft to make up for the Warthog”



[11] The role played by the Luftwaffe’s Ju 87 Stukas in the Barbarossa campaign, when panzer and mechanized divisions frequently outran the mass of horse-drawn field artillery, is archetypal of “flying artillery”

[12] – See here



[15] Commercial-Off-The-Shelf; not directly applicable here, but used to refer to the fact that market-only options are being used


[17] ,

[18] See also:

[19] The Kiowa is frequently used in overwatch roles:


[21] The total cost of fleet ownership includes aircraft procurement as well as 20 years of fleet operation costs. List of sources:, – AT-802U operating costs,, – OH-58D costs


[23]   – Python 4 missile integration,

[24] Not to say that Armed Ag planes do not have this capability, just that they are not typically deployed with those systems due to the additional cost. It is likely that the UAE’s IOMAX AT-802Us have some sort of night attack / bad weather capability.

[25] This cost also likely includes training for the Afghan Air Force; and it should be noted that SNC and Embraer built an entire production line specifically for 20 aircraft, further inflating the cost:

[26] This capability varies; the Super Tucano is capable of this, and perhaps the KT-1 is as well, but the AT-6 has notably come under fire for its perceived shortcomings in this area.



[29] This is also assuming that the A-10’s operating cost per flight hour will not increase, which it plainly will as it ages.



[32] This, I would argue, not only lowers costs, but because the guy in the back doesn’t have to worry about flying the airplane (as an A-10’s wingman would), spotting the enemy will be quicker.


[34] The power generation capacity of the A-10 has improved, but it is likely that it is fairly limited still.

[35] Guy in the Back

Why A-10 Supporters have got the Air Force’s Stance All Wrong

A recent interview with the head of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command,[1] an op-ed by Chuck Norris,[2] and Sen. John McCain’s now month-old exhortation that he would “reverse” the Air Force’s decision to retire the aircraft, the battle for the future of the A-10 has been joined once again, and with new fervor.[3] The reasons why this battle continues onwards, however are arguably due to a fundamental disconnect between the supporters of the A-10.

An A-10C of the 81st Fighter Squadron flying over Germany in the year 2000:


What the supporters (still) say:

While lobbing in expensive precision-guided munitions from great distances can be useful in many scenarios, it is a far cry from the kind of CAS of which the A-10 is capable.”[4]

“The cheap, effective A-10 is a symbol and counterpoint for how broken today’s acquisition system for expensive systems like the F-35 is,” Smithberger said.”[5]

“ explains, “Its combination of large and varied ordnance load, long loiter time, accurate weapons delivery, austere field capability, and survivability has proven invaluable to the United States and its allies.””[6]

“Savings of $3.5 billion over five years remains the Air Force’s primary justification for retiring the A-10, which they allegedly want to keep but cannot afford. However, the Air Force budget argument fails to address total defense expenditures. The A-10 is, by far, the cheapest CAS platform to operate.”[7]

These and many more arguments miss the point about A-10 retirement because operating in a sophisticated enemy air-defense network at low altitude is dangerous in any aircraft, the opportunity costs of keeping the A-10 are significant, including on new procurement, and finally, given the current defense industrial footing, replacing the A-10 will not be as difficult as replacing the other Air Force platforms up for retirement.

Sophisticated Air Defense Networks

Proponents of the A-10 often laugh off suggestions that the aircraft is not survivable; with ‘Twelve hundred pounds of titanium armor protecting the cockpit, redundancy of all major systems, and a plethora of other features make[ing] the A-10 the toughest fighter ever built.”[8] Yet, while the aircraft was designed to survive over the Cold War battlefields of Central Europe and survive, the battlefields of the Cold War were decidedly less dangerous than the battlefields of today – and especially at low altitude. For instance, much in the available literature is made of the Warthog’s ability to handily outperform the ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” mobile AAA system, still in use around the world today. It is a known fact that A-10 pilots were readily capable of firing deadly bursts from their GAU-8 cannon without the Shilka’s cannon rounds so much as touching the aircraft, due to the difference in muzzle speeds.[9] However, against a later-generation Pantsir-S1, the A-10 would have a tough time operating at low altitude due to that systems’ sophisticated use of both guns and sophisticated, jam-resistant missiles.[10]



The missiles are the key component to consider because the ability of a missile to hit a target has, since the end of the Cold War, steadily outstripped the ability to defend against missiles, especially sophisticated ones.[11] Nowhere is this more apparent that with air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles.[12] Given this understanding, reliance on stealth, sophisticated and thick electronic jamming, standoff weapons, and staying out of low-altitude environments are paramount factors for any air platform’s survival. Due to the fact that the A-10 is purpose-built to operate at low-altitudes, it simply would not survive for very long in a contested air environment. Additionally, as my previous article outlined, the survivability of the A-10 even in Desert Shield and Desert Storm was simply not good enough to avoid the Air Force brass curtailing its area of operations for over half of the war.[13] While the A-10 could absorb more small-arms and AAA fire than any other aircraft, the modern low-altitude environs are occupied with far more than just AAA; sophisticated MANPADS and SHORADS proliferating to such an extent to make the lower altitudes more lethal than ever, especially for targets such as helicopters.[14]

ZSU-23-4 “Shilka:”


The Opportunity Costs of Keeping the A-10

What has been so absent from the discussion of the A-10 have been even approximate understandings of the opportunity cost of keeping the aircraft in service. While the U.S. Air Force’s current number has wavered from $3.5 billion to $4.2 billion, one thing that has remained apparent has been the focus on the cost of retiring the aircraft, scheduled under budget plans to occur within five years.[15] Unlike what its proponents seem to acknowledge, however, this is much, much less than the cost of “saving” the aircraft by keeping it in service.[16] Before sequestration, USAF plans had the A-10 retiring from the fleet at 2028; with potentially more service-life upgrades possible.[17] Given a retirement date of 2028, then, the actual cost of keeping the A-10 in service is not a pittance, as its proponents argue; it is, even with conservative estimates, it incurs a significant operating cost. Simply by extrapolating the $700 million-a-year figure of the US Air Force retirement estimate, over the next 13 years, the aircraft would incur nearly $10 billion in operating costs. While this is not a large number overall, the nature of sequestration budget limits will mean that the money will have to be found elsewhere; and looking in the F-35 program, one would have to forgo, given average procurement costs, 85 F-35s. Given the loss of international customers, and the further driving up of unit price that would likely occur as a result of a smaller production run, it seems likely that this number would be much higher, possibly as many as 120-140 F-35s. When overlayed against other, less-expensive but still critical Air Force programs, (for instance, such as the KC-46 tanker) the relative numbers of aircraft at stake would be higher still, arguably impacting readiness across a wider and more critical range of missions than the cost of keeping the aircraft in service.

Table 1 ($ in millions, where listed)

Category 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 Total
A-10 Operating Cost  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $700  $9,800
F-35A Acquisition Numbers 26 44 48 60 60 60 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 938
F-35A Total Program Cost  $4,106  $5,848  $6,056  $6,788  $6,642  $6,499  $8,170  $8,288  $8,536  $8,588  $8,737  $8,967  $9,121  $9,094  $105,441
F-35A Program Unit Cost  $158  $133  $126  $113  $111  $108  $102  $104  $107  $107  $109  $112  $114  $114  $116
Number of 2015-Cost F-35As Forgone by A-10 62
Number of 2021-Cost F-35As Forgone by A-10 96
Average Number of F-35As Forgone by A-10 85

 Even the most intelligent and lucid commentators regarding keeping the A-10 in service, however, have been blind to the dichotomy faced by Air Force leaders. For instance, Major Ben Fernandes, in his closing statement, recommends that “If measures of effectiveness show the A-10 to be more effective and less costly [for Close Air Support missions] then the Air Force should change its decision and retire one of the six operational F- or B- series platforms.” Most frequently, A-10 proponents argue that due to their lack of effectiveness in CAS roles, especially in environments such as Afghanistan, at least one of the B-series bomber aircraft should be retired.

While the B-52 and B-1 do suffer from several problems, such as low mission readiness rate, high amounts of maintenance, operationally, their size and flexibility is incredibly useful for delivering a wide range of ordnance and winning control of the air. For instance, from the internal bomb bay alone, a B-52 can deploy 20 2,000lb guided bombs, and with external stores can carry far more than that.[18] Even conventionally, single bomber sorties can decimate swathes of enemy targets from long-range.

Perhaps most importantly, the B-52 and B-1 are the mainstay of one of the USAF’s legs of the nuclear triad. Cutting these fleets will cut back nuclear force readiness massively, due to the rarity of nuclear platforms in the U.S. arsenal and the financial difficulty of recapitalizing the triad’s other elements.[19] While the A-10 has a wide mission benefits, namely, being able to carry out CSAR missions in conjunction with helicopters, and being indisputably the best aircraft for conventional close air support missions, it does not have anything like the range of critical responsibilities that USAF bombers have.[20]

The Defense Industrial Side of Things

Finally, another strong justification for the retirement of the A-10 is that, from a defense industrial perspective, manufacturing an attack aircraft from scratch is far simpler than manufacturing a bomber or fighter (to replace a F- or B- series aircraft) from scratch. In particular, the contrast between attack aircraft and bombers is especially important from a defense industrial perspective.

Recent defense analysts, and the commanding general of Air Combat Command himself, have raised the prospect of the A-10 being replaced by a new, off-the-shelf aircraft: the Textron Scorpion. While certainly not a direct replacement for the A-10, lacking a 30mm cannon and a titanium tub to protect the pilot, the Scorpion is nevertheless an aircraft capable of delivering ordnance on-target and most importantly for the Air Force, at extremely low costs per flight hour. While the aircraft has not been ordered yet, Textron claims that the entire program went from concept to fully-fledged flight prototype in 23 months – an astonishingly short time. Such a platform could be completely fielded in close to a half-decade, were the USAF to express interest in it. The Scorpion would by no means be the only aircraft on the market, either; the clean-sheet or older designs for the densely populated T-X program could likely be adapted for a close-air-support aircraft, and all are likely to be capable aircraft.

Textron AirLand Scorpion:


By contrast, replacing a bomber fleet within the next two decades, let alone one, would be very difficult. The expected initial operational capability for the USAF’s Long-Range Strike-Bomber (B-3 as it is called by some) is expected to be sometime in the mid-2020s but production will be relatively slow, and only two defense companies have demonstrated they are even capable of producing the product.[21] The B-52 is scheduled to be in service until at least 2044,[22] with the B-1 scheduled to serve through 2040.[23] Given the importance these two bombers have in the nuclear triad, and the operational necessity of keeping them in service for several decades more, the operational risk of divesting either one of these bombers early (with their retirement the U.S. bomber fleet will shrink significantly and impact readiness) is arguably too high.[24]

A B-1B Lancer releasing munitions over a USAF desert test range:



While the A-10 retirement is unpleasant, the Air Force is standing on fairly solid ground when it says that the A-10 is the “lowest risk” option. The Air Force is also standing on solid ground when it says that the A-10, due to its unique mission profile, is not survivable against modern, sophisticated air defense networks, which are significantly more lethal than in the skies over Central Europe in the 1980s. Finally, the Air Force, especially when it comes to bomber platforms, is standing on solid ground for the future. By retiring the A-10, it does so in the knowledge that the defense market is capable of providing a veritable array of replacement types, and in doing so quickly, unlike other options posed to the service by proponents of the A-10.









[9] See Spick ed. (2000) The Great Book of Modern Warplanes Pg. 58-59


[11] – With a rumored 95% one-shot hit-to-kill probability, the Starstreak is a short-range SAM likely of above-average (not necessarily class-leading) performance.

[12] “In conclusion, the perception that contemporary Russian and Chinese SAM systems can be defeated as easily as Syrian and Iraqi systems in 1982 and 1991 is nothing more than wishful thinking, arising from a complete failure to study and understand why and how SAM defences failed or succeeded in past conflicts.” The development here is admittedly greater than for MANPADS


[14] “Helicopter countermeasures are probably effective against the 1960s era SA-7, but their effectiveness against the 1980s era SA-18 is less certain, cautions John Pike.”










[24] – Only 80-100 replacement B-3s are being built. Currently the Air Force has 20 B-2s, 66 B-1s and 76 B-52s. Divesting one of the B-series bombers would have significant consequences on the size of the overall fleet, an important consideration given the low mission availability rates of all B-series aircraft.

The U.S. Army’s Kiowa Retirement; An Opportunity Gained, Not Lost

As of FY 2015, the U.S. Army, beset by budget cuts, has been forced to expand its Aviation Restructuring Initiative, which confirms what for many observers was long on the cards after the Armed Aerial Scout competition was killed in 2013: the retirement of its OH-58D Kiowa scout helicopters.[1] Replacing the capability that was in 2013 regarded as the U.S. Army’s “number-one need, today,”[2] will now not be undergone by a manned aircraft. Instead, the U.S. Army has chosen to not only use the AH-64D/E Apache helicopter in that role (posing serious cost concerns of its own) but has chosen to pair that platform with the U.S. Army’s MQ-1C Grey Eagle fleet of unmanned aircraft under its MUM-T[3] program.[4] As will be illustrated, this is tactically an undesirable situation, and if sequestration ends, affording the U.S. Army to grow rather than shrink its aviation brigades, investment in manned, fixed-wing aircraft should take place. Before outlining how that will occur, however, it makes sense to outline why such an investment is even necessary.

The Role of the Scout Helicopter

Scout helicopters were helicopters first used in the conflict in Korea.[5] Their role was relatively simple – to penetrate into contested territory (if not airspace) ahead of friendly troop movements to spot the enemy, relaying the information back to ground commanders. From the beginning, these helicopters were deployed with pylon-mounted machine guns and unguided rockets, allowing them to punish isolated and unprotected enemy formations while carrying out observation, which was in many cases a task greatly simplified by the anti-aircraft fire they received from enemy formations.[6] The fact that they took so much fire made their ability to deliver it right back fairly important – though in the Vietnam era observation was arguably more important, given the paucity of observation and reconnaissance assets capable of discerning targets in the dense jungles of Vietnam.

As intelligence capabilities have grown exponentially, however, especially towards the end of Iraq and beginning of the surge in Afghanistan,[7] the necessity of having a manned helicopter to gather intelligence has diminished significantly. This necessity is diminished especially when one considers that the Army’s OH-58 Kiowa helicopters are relatively slow, vulnerable to ground fire, and have very limited MEDEVAC and transportation capability.[8] What has not been diminished has been the scout helicopter’s ability to quickly deliver ordnance on the targets they discover, given the less-than-existential conflicts the U.S. Army has been operating in. Because of their ability to deliver enough ordnance for most tactical situations, the accounting of operating any heterogenous aircraft fleet comes into play.

The OH-58D Armed Scout Helicopter:



Operating Cost and the OH-58D Scout Helicopter

Pictured below is the operating cost per flight hour of various U.S. Army rotary wing aircraft. Highlighted in red are attack helicopters, in particular, the AH-64 Apache family. The other helicopters are scout helicopters. As one can see, the operating cost of a scout helicopters is at most, one-half of the cost of operating attack helicopters. As a result, intelligent managers of such a fleet of aircraft would, for accounting reasons, fly the AH-64s only when it was absolutely necessary to ensure the survival of troops in contact. It is for this reason that the OH-58D, the mainstay of the Army’s scout helicopter fleet, has been described as the Army’s “workhorse” in Iraq and Afghanistan. Essentially, while Kiowas played important reconnaissance roles even as recently as the beginning of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, their roles have increasingly been turning to that of close air support, and for good reason: cost.[10]

FY15 DOD Rotary Wing Aviation O&M Reimbursable Rates ($/Hour)
Aircraft Fuel DLR Consumables Depot Other(CLS) Total
AH-64A $411 $3,329 $745 $140 $1,639 $6,264
AH-64D $411 $3,329 $745 $436 $1,639 $6,560
OH-58C $73 $408 $116 $61 $405 $1,063
OH-58D $119 $1,500 $499 $61 $752 $2,931
A/MH-6M $112 $10 $81 $61 $1,545 $1,809


Replacing these assets with already-procured ones like the AH-64E and the MQ-1C makes sense, at least in the short-term, given the lack of funding to the federal government as a whole. However, tactically, and especially given that more OH-58s are now being used in a strike role, this poses problems. The first problem is that the MQ-1C typically operates at a much higher altitude than an OH-58, being relatively large and optimized for medium-altitude persistent flight. It is rather difficult to fly a MQ-1C through canyons in the way one can with a scout helicopter. Secondly, compared to an OH-58D, the MQ-1C lacks weapons capability, being only equipped with four AGM-114K Hellfire laser-guided missiles, while the OH-58 typically has seven Hydra 70 laser-guided rockets with an additional .50 caliber machine gun pod.[12] Finally, the MQ-1C is a division-level asset, with possibly only as many as 31 ground control stations being procured.[13]

It is conceivable that these issues of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle might be overcome by other means, but to top it off, the MQ-1C even has the same sensor payload as the OH-58, meaning that given that OH-58s tend to operate at lower altitudes, MQ-1C sensors will not perform as well – and finding the enemy will be more difficult.

Given the budgetary constraints of the U.S. Army, however, such a stance is understandable –especially as it arguably augments the capability of AH-64 crews to protect themselves. If the Army is to resuscitate the armed scout helicopter, however, it should at least consider an “outside the box” solution; that solution being purchasing fixed-wing aircraft.

The Air Tractor AT-802U– or something like it.


Given that we have established that armed helicopters are going to be used more for strike than for reconnaissance in the future, given the proliferation of tactical UAVs, it makes sense to consider a replacement platform which can conduct reconnaissance but can also destroy targets of opportunity as they arise. The platform which arguably makes quite a lot of sense in this role is the Air Tractor AT-802U. Designed primarily to be a fire-fighting aircraft (but with crop-dusting variants) the Air Tractor has notably been exported to the UAE Special Forces Aviation. It is highly maneuverable, especially at low altitudes[15] and has been armored to deal with anti-aircraft fire.[16] More importantly, the operating and acquisition costs of the aircraft are extremely low (the manufacturer claims $400 per flight hour), it is capable of operating from rough airstrips in forward-deployed positions, and can stay airborne for up to 10 hours – with a 2,500lb payload. Perhaps most relevantly, it has a fearsome array of armaments that can be mounted onboard; twin .50 cal Gatling guns with 2,600 rounds and 2.75” laser-guided rockets being literally the tip of the iceberg.[17]

Naturally, there are downsides to the U.S. Army operating this aircraft. For one, the U.S. Air Force will likely oppose any effort for the U.S. Army to operate fixed-wing aircraft – an idea which has been proposed and successively shot down, with the A-10 ground attack machine.[18] Secondly, while deploying from forward airstrips sounds great on paper, OH-58s can be landed pretty much anywhere; an Air Tractor would need enough space to be undeployable in certain scenarios. Thirdly, even the loss of the minimal flexibility for medevac and transport that the OH-58 does have would be rued by Army commanders, and understandably. But the effectiveness of the Air Tractor in close air support roles would far outpoint that of the OH-58, and in reconnaissance it would be of comparable, if not far superior capability, due to its increased endurance, higher speed, and capability to operate at low altitudes.
Hence, while the Army’s retirement of the OH-58 helicopter entails a loss of capability (especially in cost-saving) by procuring fixed-wing aircraft, they may be able to not only replace their capabilities, but upgrade them. If sequestration were to end, the U.S. Army would do itself a favor by at least considering this route.

[1] ,


[3] Manned-UnManned-Teaming.




[7] – Procurement of RQ-11 Ravens is arguably the best example of this expansion.

[8] See here for the extent of transport capability – which might make it slightly difficult to fire the unguided rockets on that platform.


[10] ; though this example demonstrates that as late as 2011, Kiowas were being used as reconnaissance platforms.



[13] Typically, 1 ground control station can operate only 1 aircraft (as the aircraft can be put up into 8 hour orbits for 24-hour surveillance) but the Army’s ground control stations may be able to control 2 aircraft simultaneously. Either way, it is not at all comparable to the fleet size and availability of the OH-58. (Page 5)


[15] See 2:14 for an incredibly tight turn radius (though, admittedly, it likely suffers from a poor roll rate)



[18] However, it should be noted that the Army currently operates fixed-wing aircraft anyway, commonly referred to as “funnies”:

Debaltseve – After the Capture

The recent capture of Debaltseve by the forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics has been widely regarded by many commentators as a major defeat and a humiliation of Ukrainian arms.[1] This view, as this post intends to lay out, is an incorrect one. To analyze and assess properly the results of the battle, I will begin with an examination of the arguments for why it was a “defeat” made by commentators. Firstly, they argue that the Ukrainians lost territory which they had expected to hold. Secondly, commentators argue that the withdrawal from Debaltseve was characterized by “hastiness” and ipso facto weakness, indecision, nearly leading to a rout. Thirdly, they argue that the Ukrainians were overmatched and overpowered on the ground, and the results of the battle clearly show it. After examining these arguments, it is worth examining a parallel issue with parsing the results of Debaltseve – accurately determing strengths and losses. Having analyzed all of these, it will then be possible to gauge whether and in what degree Debaltseve can be considered a defeat for Ukraine.


The Area of Operations for the Debaltseve Pocket
The Area of Operations for the Debaltseve Pocket


Why a defeat? The three main justifications

As stated before, the first and most obvious justification is that the Ukrainian forces retreated from a position which they were ordered to defend. This is clearly unsurprising. It is uncontroversial to state that it is undesirable for the Ukrainian military, nominally sworn to militarily retaking all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, to lose its only salient into the enemy frontline. However, the physical scale of the retreat, as has not been pointed out by these observers, is relatively limited – only 20km to the NW.[2] As a result the mere fact that Ukrainian forces gave up territory to the separatists cannot be seen as important in and of itself. Realistically, it will only be seen as important if the retreat was brought on by losses, logistical issues, or was a preemptive withdrawal brought about by the concentration of immense enemy strength in the region.

The second justification for the characterization observers have noted that the retreat was “hasty” and seemingly not-planned. Protestations from volunteer battalion commanders of the poor planning have been widely covered.[3] However the commanders of some of those units couple these protestations with demands that that the high command should afford the volunteer battalions a separate intelligence and command structure, a fanciful demand and one which would serve to strengthen these commanders political ambitions.[4] However, while the Ukrainian forces in the Debaltseve salient were clearly withdrawing rapidly, there are genuinely strong military logics as to why a “hasty” withdrawal would be the correct one. The main reason is arguably to ensure that Russian and separatist intelligence was not able to pick up on such a withdrawal.

As has been outlined on numerous occasions, not only do the separatists, with Russian help, have a relatively clear intelligence picture in Ukraine. The high quality of Russian SIGINT is engendered by Russian dominance in electronic warfare capabilities, with Ukrainian secure communications regularly jammed.[5] As a result of this, many Ukrainian units, especially in the National Guard are forced to use insecure communications such as mobile phones. These, being insecure, are then regularly tracked and monitored by the Russian forces including the FSB and SVR.[6] In addition to their sophisticated ELINT, the separatist forces also gather significant human intelligence (HUMINT) from within the Ukrainian military.[7]

Operational security then, is likely to be responsible for the haste of the withdrawal – with inefficiencies within the Ukrainian military itself likely contributing to the reports of tanks and ammunition being abandoned.[8] These inefficiencies are likely to be logistical in nature. Fuel, or the lack of main gun ammunition, would likely be a reason for abandoning tanks given the logistical issues and heavy fighting.[9] With the Ukrainian defense industry capable of refurbishing many more, tank and vehicle losses are arguably not as important as retaining a trained cadre of troops.[10]

The third understanding for why the retreat from the Debaltseve pocket was a defeat is simply a general lack of understanding on behalf of the correspondents. Take, for example, Channel 4’s Alex Thompson, who stated: “Across the day, hundreds of Ukrainian troops have been leaving town, telling stories that speak of just one word: Defeat.”[11] The soldier’s stories that he edits into the broadcast are therefore particularly important. He stated (translated into English):

It was very heavy. We couldn’t even go to take food or water.  Yes, we were urinating in a can all the time we were sitting in a bunker; very very heavy shelling. We were praying all the time and said goodbye to our lives a hundred times; they had really good and heavy artillery.[12]

While this description of “defeat” is harrowing, it clearly differs very little from accounts of successful sieges. For instance, in describing the siege of Khe Sanh, Marine Cpl. Steve Wiese stated: “We knew we were going to be overrun and the whole world was going to end — but that happened every night(my italics). People were wounded and killed every night.”[13]

Khe Sanh, it should be noted, was a siege where the Marine defenders were outnumbered at more than 3:1.[14] It was also a siege in which, while harrowing, Marines killed at least 8 times the number of NVA as they lost themselves. Even while absolutely pummeling their opponents, Marines faced great dangers and tackled monstrous fears while fighting them. Strong opponents and tough fighting are not stories that speak clearly of defeat, however, they are merely stories that speak to the ferocity of war itself.

It should also be noted that this account backs up the majority of the positive accounts of the performance of Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve. The separatists have largely sought to discredit accounts of this performance of Ukrainian troops, primarily by continually iterating that large numbers of Ukrainian troops are surrendering.[15] While these allegations may be politically convenient to spread over the Internet, they do not accord with the reality, which is that separatist forces were continually beaten back by Ukrainian forces. Were the pro-Russian accounts true, the separatists would have completely encircled the Ukrainian forces in late January.[16]


Having examined the first three points we will now examine the parallel to these justifications of why Debaltseve was a defeat: determining the strengths of Ukrainian forces that were in Debaltseve, and also determining the casualties they took.

Understanding the casualties either side suffered is so difficult due to the lack of reliable statistics produced by either side. In the highly propagandized environment, careful examination of the statistics of both sides is necessary, beginning with those of the separatists.

Pro-Russian narrative

Going by the claims of separatist forces, particularly, the deputy chief of the DPR defense ministry, Eduard Basurin, some 3,048 Ukrainian soldiers were killed by the separatist forces.[17] That figure is, as will be demonstrated, extremely high, as will be demonstrated. Pro-Russian estimates of the number of Ukrainian soldiers present in the pocket tended to be in the range of 8,000 to 9,000 soldiers.[18]However, using fairly standard wounded:killed ratios, this figure of 3,000 killed seems fairly nonsense, as it would indicate that the entire Ukrainian force of 9,000 soldiers had been incapacitated through casualties.[19]

If we examine battles roughly comparable to Debaltseve, such as the siege of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War, the wounded : killed ratio for the U.S. forces was 8:1. Using this ratio, for the 3,000 Ukrainian deaths, 24,000 casualties, and a total of 27,000 troops, would be present. Even taking from other more “compliant” examples, such as the 2013 Battle of Bangui, it seems apparent that the minimum wounded: killed ratio in modern combat is 2:1.[20] As stated would mean that 3,000 combat deaths would mean 6,000 Ukrainian casualties – and a completely wiped out Ukrainian force. If this was actually the case, one would expect to see separatist tanks ploughing into Artemivsk right now; the fact that this is not happening demonstrates that the separatist statistics are ludicrous.[21] They also quite clearly play into the propaganda narratives of the pro-Russian governments, which are designed to make Ukraine look weak, fascist and cruel.[22]

Ukrainian narrative

Going by the claims of the Ukrainian government after the operation losses totalled 13 soldiers killed, 157 wounded with 172 captured and missing.[23] Pro-Ukrainian estimates of Ukrainian troops that were present in the salient ranged from anywhere from 2,000 to 5,000 troops.[24] The official Ukrainian figure, delivered on 18 February, indicates that roughly 3,400 troops were present in the salient, given that upon the announcement of the withdrawal, “80%” of the troops were listed as comprising of 2,475 troops and 200 vehicles.[25] That would indicate that there were roughly 3,000 troops remaining after the casualties had been accounted for.[26]

However, while this is presumably a figure backed up by more paperwork than the separatist account,[27]  a rigorous assessment will still be necessary to arrive at something approximating the truth.  In particular, it will be necessary to compare the official figures with the intensity of the fighting and the performance of the Ukrainian forces.

Taking that casualty estimate as a starting point, however, the total listed losses by Poroshenko amount to 448 losses from January 18 – February 18.[28] Given the stated size of the force in the salient, that indicates a 13.2% loss rate. Being suspicious of these figures (justifiably, given the Ukrainian issues with C3, and the example set by Iloviask), it is likely that the loss rate will be higher than this. How much higher though has to be estimated through an understanding of the dynamics and history of the battle itself.

The Debaltseve “cauldron”, “kettle” or “pocket” had been reportedly singled out for assault by the separatist forces as early as 7 November 2014.[29] However, by pretty much all accounts, separatist attacks, when mounted, had been firmly repulsed with heavy losses in their attacks throughout December and January, with regular shelling of Ukrainian positions the predominant means of attrition.[30] In the last week of January, however, the situation on the ground began to change. On 24 January, 2015 after Alexander Zakharchenko, the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic stated that his forces would cut off and encircle Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve.[31]

From that point onward, the separatist attacks were stepped up in intensity. And yet, even though separatist attacks steadily grew in intensity and frequency, their progress was hard-pressed. On 31 January, they reportedly captured Vuhlehirs’k, a significant turning point, as it allowed them to more easily bleed Ukrainian supply lines by shelling the main E40 /M03 road to Debaltseve itself.[32] However, rebel attacks against the belt of towns sitting astride the road the Ukrainian forces – Svitlodarsk, Luhanske, Myronivsky, and Krasni Pakhar, were repeatedly repulsed by Ukrainian armored counterattacks.[33] This belt now forms the frontline of the Ukrainian forces in the region.

Given Ukrainian C3 difficulties, the CONOPS they appeared to adopt – a system of outposts and checkpoints that served as trip-wires for the armored “fire-brigade” worked remarkably well, though this meant that checkpoints often traded hands between Ukrainians and the rebels. Importantly, at no point could it be confirmed that large numbers of Ukrainian troops were lost to single enemy actions. That being said, in the aftermath of the capture of Debaltseve, approximately 100 Ukrainian captured servicemen were displayed by the separatists, though it does not appear that these prisoners necessarily surrendered en masse. [34] Due to its trumpeting by separatist forces it is likely the most substantial single loss suffered in the Debaltseve salient.

Given this reading of the battle how are we to modify the loss rate given the reluctance or incapability of the Ukrainian side to fully disclose accurate figures or estimates? The 13% loss rate seems low based on the relatively high tempo of Ukrainian operations, outlined above, the numerical superiority of the opposition,[35]  length of time of actual operations,[36] and the Ukrainian penchant for deflating the numbers of killed and wounded, demonstrated most dramatically in the debacle at Iloviask.[37]

The rate is likely to be higher than that, though not much higher – as the haste of the withdrawal and the ineffectiveness of the enemy’s artillery in producing casualties against prepared Ukrainian positions would indicate. A fair estimate for a loss rate would likely be roughly 20% of the available units, or roughly 1.5 times the stated number. This higher rate takes into account the additional 100 Ukrainians captured, losses incurred before the arbitrary 18 January starting point, and the “fudge factor” which the current figures are likely incorporating, to contribute to the reputations and careers of officers in the Ukrainian military. [38]As a result of this rate, the numbers of losses would range from 700 to 1,000 men lost, depending on the size of the force that was in fact deployed.[39]

Defeat or draw?

With that estimate of losses in mind, can the Battle of Debaltseve be regarded as a crushing defeat for Ukrainian arms? I would suggest not but due to the retreat and likely significant casualties, it is clearly not a victory for the Ukrainians. Rather than being seen as a defeat though, it would make sense to see the battle for Debaltseve, at least tactically, as a draw. The Ukrainians extracted the majority of their force out against a stronger force that had it surrounded on three sides; the forces in the pocket generally fought hard and well against the separatist forces, in all but the most die-hard separatist accounts, and did so with significant logistical shortages and little to no air support.

Why the loss of Debaltseve is so troubling is not because of what actually happened on the battlefield, but what the relentlessness of the separatists, and Russian forces on the ground indicates. With Russian forces and support on the ground, Ukraine will find it hard-pressed to launch offensives strong enough to sweep back the separatists as they were able to do last summer before the disaster at Iloviask. While the Ukrainians acquitted themselves well in these defensive battles for Debaltseve, matching even the Russian forces at times, they needed a battlefield victory to garner support for their domestic and international political agenda. The retreat showed them incapable of doing this. In this environment, efforts at peace and ceasefire do make sense – but as Putin, Zakharchenko and Plotnizky have ruthlessly demonstrated in Debaltseve, both sides have to voluntarily submit to peace efforts. The lesson of Debaltseve, then, is that in spite of the valiant efforts of the Ukrainian forces, and European diplomats peace will take hold only once both forces have been literally stopped in their tracks.




[4] This last point is a plain reason why this accusation should necessarily be viewed with suspicion, especially as the proposal for a separate command and intelligence apparatus was rejected out of hand by many of the volunteer battalions.,,


[6] v


[8] – National Guard SF unit received a 10-minute warning for their withdrawal.








[16], and many more.



[19] Soldiers have to be alive to retreat in great numbers as pro-Russian propaganda suggest.


[21] In particular both battles were characterized by a heavy use of artillery, resupply and medevac issues faced as a result, and the significant outnumbering of the defenders. Granted, resupply and medevac at Khe Sanh could be carried out via air, but the runway was continually shelled by NVA limiting its operational availability. Similar parallels can be drawn with the E40/M03 road, continually shelled by separatist forces which limited ammunition resupply and medevac efforts.  Afghanistan, a more modern conflict is even more pronounced with respect to its wounded:killed ratio, displayed here at 10:1

[22] See here:, Ukraine is not immune to this propagandistic streak, by the way: both sides have alleged the use of barrier troops (i.e., troops deliberately positioned to fire upon retreaters) to draw parallels with Stalin’s brutal way of making war and to discredit the other side: Ukraine’s propaganda, however, is less vocal and less powerful, because it does not have the broadcasting power that Putin’s organization does, especially in RT.,




[26] Perhaps, however, there were 2,900 as Poroshenko did say that 100 troops were injured during the retreat:

[27] And one with a greater potential for accuracy, given that attackers leave their casualties on enemy-defended territory, not the other way around.






[33] Additionally, Lohvynove was a town repeatedly contested over (now ceded to rebel control) where Ukrainian forces repeatedly beat back the separatists:,


Kransnyi Pakhar:,

Luhanske: , ,


[34] Excluding separatist reports, tweets and estimates, which, as we have showed, are very unreliable.


[36] – Quoted the


[38] The intra-case comparison with Iloviask is an important one to draw. At that battle, the government claimed 108 soldiers were KIA, but after the investigation conducted by the Ukrainian parliament, that number was revealed to be 241: a factor difference of precisely 2.23. However, by pretty much all accounts, the Ukrainian forces fought much better at Debaltseve. Hence, the Ukrainian military does not necessarily have to fudge the numbers as much – though with propaganda wars almost as important as what goes on on the ground, wariness should be rewarded.

[39] It is arguable that due to the likely better combat performance of a larger force, casualties would occur at a similar rate to that of a smaller force.