Shredding Pace-Finletter, the U.S. Army, and Close Air Support

The recent debate over the retirement of the A-10 Warthog and OH-58 Kiowa aircraft and helicopters respectively has sparked a very fervent debate over the future of the mission of close air support.[1] With the 2011 Budget Control Act still serving as a significant brake on U.S. military spending (with the Pentagon’s budget request coming to 3.24% of U.S. GDP), the cutting of both of these platforms is seen by the U.S. Air Force and Army as a sad but inevitable occurrence.[2] By detractors, however, both decisions are seen as hopelessly misguided ones, as they throw out the most effective (the Air Force) and most frequently used (Army) close air support assets.[3]

What this article will suggest, however, is that rather than splitting the mission of close air support (CAS) up by service, it may be a good idea to blend the efforts of the two services once more.[4] While this may not be a novel solution, it is one which may allow the U.S. military to retain a crucial, and importantly cost-effective, ability to support troops at the forward edge of the battle area. Before outlining why, however, the origins of the current split in close-air-support assets need to be explained.

Pace-Finletter MoU

The split in close-air-support asset types was first really delineated with the Pace-Finletter Memorandum of Understanding in 1952.[5] At a time when the USAF was still only five years old and when the Korean War was going on, both the U.S. Army and Air Force agreed to limit the size of U.S. Army fixed-wing strike aircraft to below 5,000 pounds in weight – deliberately precluding the opportunity for the Army to build up a capable fixed-wing CAS fleet.[6] This agreement was later built upon by the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966 which resolved the Air Force and Army to not command units of rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft respectively.[7]

While these existing agreements limit the Army’s options, the general climate between the Air Force and the Army would suggest that they could probably be overwritten.[8] No longer is the Air Force struggling to forge an identity as a service branch, or fighting with the same ferocity for budget dollars with the other services; it does not “need” the close air support mission to justify its independence. However, to override previous arrangements most effectively, the agreement would simply need to lift the limits on U.S. Army procurement of fixed-wing attack aircraft. Doing so would give the Army the most flexibility in their effort to fulfill the close air support mission. Given that the Congressional support for the A-10 in part hinges on the fact that no replacement for that aircraft is planned, giving the Army a platform to carry out the close air support mission would alleviate Congress’ concerns.[9]

Given the idea’s feasibility, then the important question then becomes, “how should the U.S. Army go about filling the role of close air support?” To answer that question adequately, however, requires a thorough understanding of the close air support mission.

Close Air Support Currently

The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Publication “Joint Publication 3-09.3: Close Air Support” defines close air support as: “air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces, and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”[10] Colloquially, CAS has been described in a variety of ways, with “flying artillery” being a particularly apt one in this case. Historically, especially for fast-moving and mobile campaigns, aircraft have been used to provide fire support in place of artillery.[11] CAS is similar, though the versatility of aircraft (and their greater accuracy in many environments) means that a variety of different effects can be brought to bear against the enemy, from suppression fires, produced from cannon and machine guns,[12] to much larger precision fires such as 2,000lb Laser-Guided JDAM.[13] Most importantly, CAS is a mission most flown when air supremacy has been achieved. However, no matter the payload delivered, close-air-support-specific aircraft generally are designed around several principles; good visibility, slow speed, large amounts of aerodynamic lift, good loiter endurance at low altitude, the ability to deliver significant amounts of munitions and physical ruggedness.

Good visibility is important not only for pilots looking out of the cockpit but also for sensor pods (some are restricted by fixed landing gear, for example). Slow speed (or more specifically, low stall speed) is important especially for unguided munitions due to its effect on accuracy. The lower the speed of the aircraft, the higher the accuracy of the munitions on target. Lift is important because it allows for long loiter periods, but also maneuverability and turn capability, important for dodging missiles and getting inside enemy aircraft if need be.[14] Loiter endurance is important because of the ability it affords one to make multiple target passes, and to stay on station longer, lowering the number of aircraft one needs to devote to CAS, especially in a lower-threat environment.  Having significant amounts of combat ordnance on hand is useful for obvious reasons, namely because you can destroy more targets in a single sortie. Finally, physical ruggedness, both in terms of resistance to enemy fire and ability to operate from a variety of different areas in terms of runways, is crucial for operating as close as possible to friendly troops, affording quicker response time.

These characteristics are, as mentioned, particular to fixed-wing aircraft, and all are applicable to the A-10, especially when compared to other aircraft such as the F-16. However, given the plans to retire the A-10 the question of how to replicate these characteristics without this and other aircraft needs to be asked. In particular, it is worth asking the question of how one would replicate these characteristics without simply bringing these aircraft back from the Boneyard, or by designing something all-new.

COTS[15] CAS

Answering that above question will need to involve an assessment of potential options to fill the role of close-air-support aircraft. Given the current budgetary pressures, any replacement will have to be extremely cost-effective – which almost always means products that have already been developed. In particular, this analysis will look at three classes of aircraft; Armed Agricultural, Light Prop Attack and Light Attack (Jet). While these platforms are undoubtedly less sophisticated than the A-10, for instance, as CAS platforms they have their merits, and in many ways are far more sophisticated than the Army’s principal CAS platform, the OH-58 Kiowa.[16] Hence, examining the options class-by-class, we can come to an understanding of exactly what could replace existing capabilities – and also how much each would cost.

Armed Agricultural

Armed Agricultural aircraft are, in terms of sophistication, the least sophisticated class outlined here. As the name indicates, these aircraft are essentially crop-dusters modified for military use, which, initially, sounds like a fairly ridiculous replacement for dedicated CAS aircraft such as the A-10. However, compared to scout helicopters such as the OH-58 Kiowa, their characteristics would likely lend themselves fairly well to the CAS mission. Firstly, they are aircraft designed to spend life at very low altitude – which gives them large wings, and long endurance, even with heavy payloads. Secondly, they have a slow enough speed (and stall speed) to make them useful for delivering ordnance, while still possessing higher-than-helicopter dash speed enabling them to reach battlefields faster. Thirdly, they are rugged enough to operate from virtually any strip, road, uneven grass or pavement, which means that they are capable of operating close to quickly-moving frontlines. Finally, many of the Armed Agricultural aircraft on the market are equipped with long endurance, enabling them to loiter over target areas for a long period of time, in some cases, much longer than even the A-10.

Aircraft in this class include the Air Tractor AT-802U and the IOMAX Archangel (both pictured below) and are both capable of carrying far more ordnance than Kiowa helicopters (more than twice the number of .50 cal machine guns and rocket pods, while also carrying 500lb bombs).[17] Interestingly, they are also much cheaper to procure and operate, if not as operationally flexible. As seen in the chart below, procuring and operating a fleet of AT-802U Air Tractors (one of the leading aircraft in the class) instead of OH-58D Kiowas would be significantly cheaper based on verifiable cost data for the aircraft in question – though the scale of the cost differential is likely to be narrower in favor of the AT-802 for several reasons.

One, the aircraft’s low cost per flight hour has not been demonstrated in hostile environments where the existing fleet is required to conduct missions at a very high operational tempo, as have the Kiowas. The lower number of annual flight hours means that the real cost per flight hour of the AT-802 is several times higher than the quoted $400 per flight hour.

Secondly, it is unlikely that so many (825) Air Tractors would be procured due to the higher budgetary strain this would impose through necessitating the training maintainers and pilots. This is another reason that the operating cost per flight hour for the Air Tractor is likely to be higher, as the number of airframes procured is likely to be equal to – or lower than – the Kiowa.[18] That number of airframes would have to endure a higher operational tempo, which in terms of fuel and maintenance support, would drive up costs.

Finally, the relative inflexibility of the Air Tractor’s employment compared to the Kiowa, while the Air Tractor’s dollars will perhaps buy more effectiveness in the CAS and surveillance roles, it will not buy as effective overwatch capability or vertical take-off and hovering capability.[19] That being said, it is likely that the Air Tractor and other aircraft in the Armed Agricultural class still have a lower operating cost than the Kiowa, and would be, due to their low speed, and high munition loads, quite suitable for the CAS mission – especially compared to helicopters (frankly, of almost any type) in the CAS role.[20]

Figure 1: Air Tractor vs. OH-58D Kiowa procurement and operating costs[21]

Aircraft Type	Airframe Cost ($k)	Estimated Sensor Suite Cost($k)	Fleet Size	Operating Cost per Flight Hour	Annual Number of Flight-Hours Per Aircraft	Annual Cost of Fleet Operation ($k)	Total Cost of Fleet Ownership ($k)	Total Number of Flight Hours(k)
OH-58D Kiowa	–	–	338	$2,931	1080	1,069,932	21,398,640	5,476
AT-802U Air Tractor	$3,000	$3,000	825	$400	450	148,500	5,370,000	5,569

 

Figure 2: AT-802U Air Tractor

Figure 3: IOMAX Archangel Block 3

Light Prop Attack

Light Prop Attack aircraft, by contrast with Armed Agricultural aircraft, are more sophisticated aircraft. Aircraft of this class (for instance, such as the Beechcraft AT-6, Embraer Super Tucano, and KAI KA-1) are are faster, with top speeds of 300kts compared to 200kts,[22] built for a greater variety of missions, including air patrol,[23] and typically have more sophisticated avionics and sensor systems, allowing them to operate with a lower pilot workload and in denser weather conditions.[24]However, the cost of these aircraft is significantly higher – from $10 million for the KAI KT-1 to up to $20.8 million for the U.S.-manufactured Super Tucano.[25] However, their cost per flight hour is comparable to Armed Agricultural aircraft (~$1,000 per flight hour) and in some cases, they are capable of operating from unprepared airstrips.[26]

Their disadvantages, however, do exist. In addition to the cost, these aircraft, not being derived from crop-dusters, are not designed to spend their time at low altitudes, for one. Secondly, having retractable landing gear, they are not as rugged, especially with regard to takeoff and landing, as an Armed Agricultural aircraft is, an important consideration given the need to be near the frontline for higher responsiveness (though higher dash speed could potentially make up for this). Finally, due to the airframe being more optimized for speed, endurance suffers – even the Super Tucano, an aircraft with the highest endurance in-class, has only 6h 30min of endurance; not the 10 hours regularly achieved with Armed Agricultural aircraft.[27]

While proponents of the Light Prop Attack class will point to the fact that the ruggedness and endurance are sufficient for a variety of customers, their multi-mission capabilities, compared to those of Armed Agricultural airplanes, seem too well developed for the CAS mission. Granted, these aircraft are phenomenal performers in their own right, and would be a valued “low” component of a mixed-sophistication air force, allowing a cheap and readily deployable method of delivering bombs on target and carrying out light air defense. However, every aircraft ever designed is a compromise, and for the U.S. in particular, I believe it makes sense to argue that Armed Agricultural aircraft are a better fit because of their superior ruggedness, endurance, and lower operating costs. While they are not capable of carrying out light air defense missions, flexibility is ultimately not a crucial requirement for the CAS mission, and does little but add cost and complexity.

Figure 4: Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano

Figure 5: Beechcraft AT-6C

Figure 6: KAI KA-1

Light Attack (Jet)

In this final class, there is only one particular aircraft capable of being considered: the Textron AirLand Scorpion. Given the fact that this aircraft has not yet been delivered to its first customer, the cost projections may indeed be wildly inaccurate, laying to waste the crux of Textron’s business plan and the structure of this article. However, if this aircraft eventually does what it says “on the tin”, it would be a valuable platform, even for a USAF customer. The aircraft is stated to cost $20 million per platform, a cost which I seriously doubt would include training and support, and could be expected to be a significant amount higher, perhaps $28-30 million with everything included. The reported operating cost per flight hour is $3,000 – higher than Light Prop Attack aircraft, but still reasonable considering the operating cost per flight hour of an A-10 is $17,716 as of fiscal year 2013.[28] At this operating cost, and assuming the $8 million markup holds, buying and operating the Scorpion would be roughly half the cost of the A-10 for the rest of the A-10’s service life (13 years).[29] Granted, standing up a new platform would incur costs that do not factor into that consideration – but the magnitude of those costs is not likely to undermine this fundamental fact: that based on current estimates, the Scorpion is very cheap.

Figure 7: AirLand Scorpion, A-10 Procurement and Operating Costs[30]

Aircraft Type	Airframe Cost ($k)	Estimated Sensor Suite Cost($k)	Fleet Size	Operating Cost per Flight Hour	Annual Number of Flight-Hours Per Aircraft	Annual Cost of Fleet Operation ($k)	Total Cost of Fleet Ownership ($k)	Total Number of Flight Hours(k)
Textron AirLand Scorpion	28,000,000	–	350	$3,000	300	315,000	13,895,000	105
A-10	–	–	350	$17,716	300	1,860,180	24,182,340	105

 

Figure 8: Textron AirLand Scorpion

Operationally, the aircraft is not purpose-built for close air support, a fact that the supporters of the A-10 are likely to allege is the reason why the Scorpion is not a “suitable replacement”. However, the Scorpion does have several strengths which play strongly into CAS duties. For one thing, unlike typical fast jets, the Scorpion has excellent endurance of up to 5 hours’ time on station. That is more than double the A-10’s endurance.[31] Secondly, it has a two-man crew, which the A-10 does not, better divvying up workload and freeing air planners from the necessity of operating aircraft in pairs, as A-10s frequently do.[32] Thirdly, the aircraft is capable of flying just as “low and slow” as the A-10 is, ensuring the accuracy of unguided weapons.[33]  The aircraft is not as resistant to small-arms and AAA fire, admittedly, but unlike the A-10 it is not burdened electrically by the need to operate a massive cannon, meaning that more sophisticated EW and radar / IR jamming equipment can be mounted onboard to improve survivability.[34] Plus the fact that it has a second seat means that this GIB[35] can more effectively operate these EW and IR jamming systems than on the A-10, given that pilot’s already high workload.

However, it is clear that the replacement of the A-10, if indeed it is to occur, is not going to be directly achieved with purchasing the Scorpion or a product like it. But if the U.S. Army were to replace its Kiowas with an Air Tractor or something comparable, it could massively increase its effectiveness in CAS roles and reduce the pressure on the Air Force’s existing CAS fleet. That then would open up the Air Force to procure the Scorpion (if it worked as advertised) to augment this capability. With the money saved by procuring the Scorpion, one could easily break off a segment of the Scorpion fleet (or even the entire 350-aircraft fleet itself) and dedicate it to close-air-support duty. This would mean that like the A-10, Scorpion pilots would be trained 24/7/365 to carry out close-air-support and nothing but it – a factor which is consistently underappreciated in why A-10 pilots are so successful at helping ground troops.

In short, while the retirement of the A-10 and the OH-58 Kiowa is a loss for the close air support capability of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, should budget caps be rescinded and investment opened up again, it would make sense for the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force to not stick to what is known – and procure new aircraft to carry out the close-air-support roles for both services. By procuring fixed-wing aircraft to deliver CAS for the Army, and more cost-effective ones to do so for the Air Force, the CAS mission will be well served.

Sources:

[1] Here, “close air support” is defined as the delivery of aerial fires (bombs, missiles, cannon rounds, etc.) to the forward edge of the battle area. http://fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs/fm101-5-1/f545-f.htm#FEBA

[2] http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-spending-lot-or-lot-more-305019

[3] http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/01/22/save_the_a-10__give_it_to_the_army_107047.html, http://www.army.mil/article/144918/Armed_Aerial_Scout_still_valid_requirement__Army_says/

[4] http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.com/2012/02/modest-proposal-scrap-key-west.html

[5] http://xbradtc.com/2011/06/20/army-fixed-wing-cas-pt1/

[6] http://books.google.com/books?id=uC1I3vTSaEsC&pg=PA241&lpg=PA241&dq=Pace-Finletter+MOU+1952&source=web&ots=2hZwRweXe-&sig=q4QNY2qYfBCYGe9ImDc-YHuJjsU&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result#v=onepage&q=Pace-Finletter%20MOU%201952&f=false

[7] http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140512/DEFFEAT05/305120022/Commentary-Give-10s-Army, http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2008systems/7131jacques.pdf

[8] See, for instance the fact that, with the exception of a couple, most of the proponents for the A-10 have been either JTACs or USAF A-10 pilots, and not U.S. Army personnel (certainly not U.S. Army brass): https://arizonadailyindependent.com/2014/06/15/a-10-preferred-by-jtacs-for-troops-in-contact-fight/, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-05-15/soldiers-fight-to-save-a-10-warthog-jet http://thehill.com/policy/defense/205312-armys-odierno-troops-believe-in-the-a-10 – “Odierno said he believed the Air Force would find the right mix of aircraft to make up for the Warthog” http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/03/05/the-air-forces-argument-to-retire-the-a-10-warthog-doesnt-add-up-heres-why/#comment-44436

[9] http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/opinion-editorials?ID=6a20a884-6e03-446f-a99e-a0f9627a7b4f

[10] https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_09_3.pdf

[11] The role played by the Luftwaffe’s Ju 87 Stukas in the Barbarossa campaign, when panzer and mechanized divisions frequently outran the mass of horse-drawn field artillery, is archetypal of “flying artillery”

[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a0-lOQFnXUQ – See here

[13] http://defense-update.com/20100928_laser_jdam.html#.VSnJ1_nF98E

[14] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEdy84YGf1k

[15] Commercial-Off-The-Shelf; not directly applicable here, but used to refer to the fact that market-only options are being used

[16] http://www.army.mil/article/144918/Armed_Aerial_Scout_still_valid_requirement__Army_says/

[17] http://www.802u.com/ , http://www.iomax.net/pdf/IOMAX_Archangel_Brochure.pdf

[18] See also: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:DPLVVcHGfrgJ:vendornet.state.wi.us/vendornet/wais/docs/14610_1.XLS+&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

[19] The Kiowa is frequently used in overwatch roles: http://www.fayobserver.com/military/with-the-troops-kiowa-pilots-have-been-protecting-soldiers-on/article_14e480cb-306f-5b97-98db-52d7705165d9.html http://www.mensjournal.com/magazine/kiowa-helicopters-americas-new-cavalry-20131211

[20] http://aviationintel.com/amy-say-goodbye-oh-58-kiowa/

[21] The total cost of fleet ownership includes aircraft procurement as well as 20 years of fleet operation costs. List of sources: https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=5f604bd69a18b4848a7162a49b02ca72&tab=core&_cview=1,  http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lima-air-tractor-goes-on-the-offensive-383891/ – AT-802U operating costs, http://www.asafm.army.mil/offices/office.aspx?officecode=1400,  http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/keeping-the-oh-58-kiowa-warrior-flying-and-fighting/ – OH-58D costs

[22] http://www.802u.com/, http://aviationweek.com/defense/hawker-beechcraft-6c

[23] http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/190/Super-Tucano-leads-the-flock   – Python 4 missile integration, http://defensetech.org/2011/09/21/at-6-tested-for-light-air-defense-missions/

[24] Not to say that Armed Ag planes do not have this capability, just that they are not typically deployed with those systems due to the additional cost. It is likely that the UAE’s IOMAX AT-802Us have some sort of night attack / bad weather capability. http://www.iomax.net/archangel/avionics/

[25] This cost also likely includes training for the Afghan Air Force; and it should be noted that SNC and Embraer built an entire production line specifically for 20 aircraft, further inflating the cost: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2013/06/25/beechcrafts-bid-was-higher-risk-air-force/

[26] This capability varies; the Super Tucano is capable of this, and perhaps the KT-1 is as well, but the AT-6 has notably come under fire for its perceived shortcomings in this area. http://aviationweek.com/defense/hawker-beechcraft-6c

[27] http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/super_tucano/ http://www.janes.com/article/38800/iomax-offers-archangel-light-attack-turboprop-to-the-philippines

[28] http://nation.time.com/2013/04/02/costly-flight-hours/

[29] This is also assuming that the A-10’s operating cost per flight hour will not increase, which it plainly will as it ages.

[30] http://www.afsec.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-150116-014.pdf,

[31] http://www.scorpionjet.com/files/TAL-2014-OVERVIEW-LITHO.pdf

[32] This, I would argue, not only lowers costs, but because the guy in the back doesn’t have to worry about flying the airplane (as an A-10’s wingman would), spotting the enemy will be quicker.

[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMfYIjsGEmQ

[34] The power generation capacity of the A-10 has improved, but it is likely that it is fairly limited still. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/a10.html

[35] Guy in the Back

Why A-10 Supporters have got the Air Force’s Stance All Wrong

A recent interview with the head of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command,[1] an op-ed by Chuck Norris,[2] and Sen. John McCain’s now month-old exhortation that he would “reverse” the Air Force’s decision to retire the aircraft, the battle for the future of the A-10 has been joined once again, and with new fervor.[3] The reasons why this battle continues onwards, however are arguably due to a fundamental disconnect between the supporters of the A-10.

An A-10C of the 81st Fighter Squadron flying over Germany in the year 2000:

What the supporters (still) say:

“While lobbing in expensive precision-guided munitions from great distances can be useful in many scenarios, it is a far cry from the kind of CAS of which the A-10 is capable.”[4]

“The cheap, effective A-10 is a symbol and counterpoint for how broken today’s acquisition system for expensive systems like the F-35 is,” Smithberger said.”[5]

“Military.com explains, “Its combination of large and varied ordnance load, long loiter time, accurate weapons delivery, austere field capability, and survivability has proven invaluable to the United States and its allies.””[6]

“Savings of $3.5 billion over five years remains the Air Force’s primary justification for retiring the A-10, which they allegedly want to keep but cannot afford. However, the Air Force budget argument fails to address total defense expenditures. The A-10 is, by far, the cheapest CAS platform to operate.”[7]

These and many more arguments miss the point about A-10 retirement because operating in a sophisticated enemy air-defense network at low altitude is dangerous in any aircraft, the opportunity costs of keeping the A-10 are significant, including on new procurement, and finally, given the current defense industrial footing, replacing the A-10 will not be as difficult as replacing the other Air Force platforms up for retirement.

Sophisticated Air Defense Networks

Proponents of the A-10 often laugh off suggestions that the aircraft is not survivable; with ‘Twelve hundred pounds of titanium armor protecting the cockpit, redundancy of all major systems, and a plethora of other features make[ing] the A-10 the toughest fighter ever built.”[8] Yet, while the aircraft was designed to survive over the Cold War battlefields of Central Europe and survive, the battlefields of the Cold War were decidedly less dangerous than the battlefields of today – and especially at low altitude. For instance, much in the available literature is made of the Warthog’s ability to handily outperform the ZSU-23-4 “Shilka” mobile AAA system, still in use around the world today. It is a known fact that A-10 pilots were readily capable of firing deadly bursts from their GAU-8 cannon without the Shilka’s cannon rounds so much as touching the aircraft, due to the difference in muzzle speeds.[9] However, against a later-generation Pantsir-S1, the A-10 would have a tough time operating at low altitude due to that systems’ sophisticated use of both guns and sophisticated, jam-resistant missiles.[10]

Pantsir-S1:

The missiles are the key component to consider because the ability of a missile to hit a target has, since the end of the Cold War, steadily outstripped the ability to defend against missiles, especially sophisticated ones.[11] Nowhere is this more apparent that with air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles.[12] Given this understanding, reliance on stealth, sophisticated and thick electronic jamming, standoff weapons, and staying out of low-altitude environments are paramount factors for any air platform’s survival. Due to the fact that the A-10 is purpose-built to operate at low-altitudes, it simply would not survive for very long in a contested air environment. Additionally, as my previous article outlined, the survivability of the A-10 even in Desert Shield and Desert Storm was simply not good enough to avoid the Air Force brass curtailing its area of operations for over half of the war.[13] While the A-10 could absorb more small-arms and AAA fire than any other aircraft, the modern low-altitude environs are occupied with far more than just AAA; sophisticated MANPADS and SHORADS proliferating to such an extent to make the lower altitudes more lethal than ever, especially for targets such as helicopters.[14]

ZSU-23-4 “Shilka:”

The Opportunity Costs of Keeping the A-10

What has been so absent from the discussion of the A-10 have been even approximate understandings of the opportunity cost of keeping the aircraft in service. While the U.S. Air Force’s current number has wavered from $3.5 billion to $4.2 billion, one thing that has remained apparent has been the focus on the cost of retiring the aircraft, scheduled under budget plans to occur within five years.[15] Unlike what its proponents seem to acknowledge, however, this is much, much less than the cost of “saving” the aircraft by keeping it in service.[16] Before sequestration, USAF plans had the A-10 retiring from the fleet at 2028; with potentially more service-life upgrades possible.[17] Given a retirement date of 2028, then, the actual cost of keeping the A-10 in service is not a pittance, as its proponents argue; it is, even with conservative estimates, it incurs a significant operating cost. Simply by extrapolating the $700 million-a-year figure of the US Air Force retirement estimate, over the next 13 years, the aircraft would incur nearly $10 billion in operating costs. While this is not a large number overall, the nature of sequestration budget limits will mean that the money will have to be found elsewhere; and looking in the F-35 program, one would have to forgo, given average procurement costs, 85 F-35s. Given the loss of international customers, and the further driving up of unit price that would likely occur as a result of a smaller production run, it seems likely that this number would be much higher, possibly as many as 120-140 F-35s. When overlayed against other, less-expensive but still critical Air Force programs, (for instance, such as the KC-46 tanker) the relative numbers of aircraft at stake would be higher still, arguably impacting readiness across a wider and more critical range of missions than the cost of keeping the aircraft in service.

Table 1 ($ in millions, where listed)

Category	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total
A-10 Operating Cost	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$700	$9,800
F-35A Acquisition Numbers	26	44	48	60	60	60	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	938
F-35A Total Program Cost	$4,106	$5,848	$6,056	$6,788	$6,642	$6,499	$8,170	$8,288	$8,536	$8,588	$8,737	$8,967	$9,121	$9,094	$105,441
F-35A Program Unit Cost	$158	$133	$126	$113	$111	$108	$102	$104	$107	$107	$109	$112	$114	$114	$116
Number of 2015-Cost F-35As Forgone by A-10															62
Number of 2021-Cost F-35As Forgone by A-10															96
Average Number of F-35As Forgone by A-10															85

 Even the most intelligent and lucid commentators regarding keeping the A-10 in service, however, have been blind to the dichotomy faced by Air Force leaders. For instance, Major Ben Fernandes, in his closing statement, recommends that “If measures of effectiveness show the A-10 to be more effective and less costly [for Close Air Support missions] then the Air Force should change its decision and retire one of the six operational F- or B- series platforms.” Most frequently, A-10 proponents argue that due to their lack of effectiveness in CAS roles, especially in environments such as Afghanistan, at least one of the B-series bomber aircraft should be retired.

While the B-52 and B-1 do suffer from several problems, such as low mission readiness rate, high amounts of maintenance, operationally, their size and flexibility is incredibly useful for delivering a wide range of ordnance and winning control of the air. For instance, from the internal bomb bay alone, a B-52 can deploy 20 2,000lb guided bombs, and with external stores can carry far more than that.[18] Even conventionally, single bomber sorties can decimate swathes of enemy targets from long-range.

Perhaps most importantly, the B-52 and B-1 are the mainstay of one of the USAF’s legs of the nuclear triad. Cutting these fleets will cut back nuclear force readiness massively, due to the rarity of nuclear platforms in the U.S. arsenal and the financial difficulty of recapitalizing the triad’s other elements.[19] While the A-10 has a wide mission benefits, namely, being able to carry out CSAR missions in conjunction with helicopters, and being indisputably the best aircraft for conventional close air support missions, it does not have anything like the range of critical responsibilities that USAF bombers have.[20]

The Defense Industrial Side of Things

Finally, another strong justification for the retirement of the A-10 is that, from a defense industrial perspective, manufacturing an attack aircraft from scratch is far simpler than manufacturing a bomber or fighter (to replace a F- or B- series aircraft) from scratch. In particular, the contrast between attack aircraft and bombers is especially important from a defense industrial perspective.

Recent defense analysts, and the commanding general of Air Combat Command himself, have raised the prospect of the A-10 being replaced by a new, off-the-shelf aircraft: the Textron Scorpion. While certainly not a direct replacement for the A-10, lacking a 30mm cannon and a titanium tub to protect the pilot, the Scorpion is nevertheless an aircraft capable of delivering ordnance on-target and most importantly for the Air Force, at extremely low costs per flight hour. While the aircraft has not been ordered yet, Textron claims that the entire program went from concept to fully-fledged flight prototype in 23 months – an astonishingly short time. Such a platform could be completely fielded in close to a half-decade, were the USAF to express interest in it. The Scorpion would by no means be the only aircraft on the market, either; the clean-sheet or older designs for the densely populated T-X program could likely be adapted for a close-air-support aircraft, and all are likely to be capable aircraft.

Textron AirLand Scorpion:

By contrast, replacing a bomber fleet within the next two decades, let alone one, would be very difficult. The expected initial operational capability for the USAF’s Long-Range Strike-Bomber (B-3 as it is called by some) is expected to be sometime in the mid-2020s but production will be relatively slow, and only two defense companies have demonstrated they are even capable of producing the product.[21] The B-52 is scheduled to be in service until at least 2044,[22] with the B-1 scheduled to serve through 2040.[23] Given the importance these two bombers have in the nuclear triad, and the operational necessity of keeping them in service for several decades more, the operational risk of divesting either one of these bombers early (with their retirement the U.S. bomber fleet will shrink significantly and impact readiness) is arguably too high.[24]

A B-1B Lancer releasing munitions over a USAF desert test range:

Conclusion

While the A-10 retirement is unpleasant, the Air Force is standing on fairly solid ground when it says that the A-10 is the “lowest risk” option. The Air Force is also standing on solid ground when it says that the A-10, due to its unique mission profile, is not survivable against modern, sophisticated air defense networks, which are significantly more lethal than in the skies over Central Europe in the 1980s. Finally, the Air Force, especially when it comes to bomber platforms, is standing on solid ground for the future. By retiring the A-10, it does so in the knowledge that the defense market is capable of providing a veritable array of replacement types, and in doing so quickly, unlike other options posed to the service by proponents of the A-10.

[1] http://www.janes.com/article/49836/pentagon-study-validates-usaf-a-10-retirement-plan-but-no-cas-specific-replacement

[2] http://www.wnd.com/2015/03/save-the-a-10-thunderbolt/

[3] http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/03/15/could-this-airplane-replace-the-a-10-warthog.aspx

[4] http://www.nationalreview.com/article/414635/case-warthog-mike-fredenburg

[5] http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/03/15/the_a-10_warthog_too_old_to_keep_fighting__107750.html

[6] http://www.wnd.com/2015/03/save-the-a-10-thunderbolt/

[7] http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/03/05/the-air-forces-argument-to-retire-the-a-10-warthog-doesnt-add-up-heres-why/

[8] http://www.nationalreview.com/article/414635/case-warthog-mike-fredenburg

[9] See Spick ed. (2000) The Great Book of Modern Warplanes Pg. 58-59

[10] http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-96K6-Pantsir-2K22-Tunguska.html

[11] http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0050.html – With a rumored 95% one-shot hit-to-kill probability, the Starstreak is a short-range SAM likely of above-average (not necessarily class-leading) performance.

[12] http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-SAM-Effectiveness.html “In conclusion, the perception that contemporary Russian and Chinese SAM systems can be defeated as easily as Syrian and Iraqi systems in 1982 and 1991 is nothing more than wishful thinking, arising from a complete failure to study and understand why and how SAM defences failed or succeeded in past conflicts.” The development here is admittedly greater than for MANPADS

[13] https://bigtalksmalltalk.wordpress.com/2014/11/18/the-warthog-the-lightning-ii-and-an-air-force/#_ftn10

[14] http://defense-update.com/newscast/0207/analysis/analysis-100207.htm “Helicopter countermeasures are probably effective against the 1960s era SA-7, but their effectiveness against the 1980s era SA-18 is less certain, cautions John Pike.”

[15] http://breakingdefense.com/2015/02/air-force-boosts-a-10-retirement-savings-4-2b/

[16] http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/03/05/the-air-forces-argument-to-retire-the-a-10-warthog-doesnt-add-up-heres-why/

[17] http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-air-force-may-extend-fairchild-a-10-life-beyond-2028-216249/

[18] http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-b-52-is-becoming-a-terrifyingly-intelligent-smart-w-1679885252

[19] http://breakingdefense.com/2015/02/want-stability-fund-nuke-triad-modernization/

[20] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/defense-budget-cuts-b52_n_2978892.html?

[21] http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2014-07-13/us-air-force-releases-rfp-long-range-bomber

[22] http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/19/business/la-fi-ageless-b52-bomber-20130819

[23] http://defensetech.org/2014/02/21/air-force-begins-massive-b-1b-overhaul/

[24] http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2014-07-13/us-air-force-releases-rfp-long-range-bomber – Only 80-100 replacement B-3s are being built. Currently the Air Force has 20 B-2s, 66 B-1s and 76 B-52s. Divesting one of the B-series bombers would have significant consequences on the size of the overall fleet, an important consideration given the low mission availability rates of all B-series aircraft. http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/03/05/the-air-forces-argument-to-retire-the-a-10-warthog-doesnt-add-up-heres-why/

The U.S. Army’s Kiowa Retirement; An Opportunity Gained, Not Lost

As of FY 2015, the U.S. Army, beset by budget cuts, has been forced to expand its Aviation Restructuring Initiative, which confirms what for many observers was long on the cards after the Armed Aerial Scout competition was killed in 2013: the retirement of its OH-58D Kiowa scout helicopters.[1] Replacing the capability that was in 2013 regarded as the U.S. Army’s “number-one need, today,”[2] will now not be undergone by a manned aircraft. Instead, the U.S. Army has chosen to not only use the AH-64D/E Apache helicopter in that role (posing serious cost concerns of its own) but has chosen to pair that platform with the U.S. Army’s MQ-1C Grey Eagle fleet of unmanned aircraft under its MUM-T[3] program.[4] As will be illustrated, this is tactically an undesirable situation, and if sequestration ends, affording the U.S. Army to grow rather than shrink its aviation brigades, investment in manned, fixed-wing aircraft should take place. Before outlining how that will occur, however, it makes sense to outline why such an investment is even necessary.

The Role of the Scout Helicopter

Scout helicopters were helicopters first used in the conflict in Korea.[5] Their role was relatively simple – to penetrate into contested territory (if not airspace) ahead of friendly troop movements to spot the enemy, relaying the information back to ground commanders. From the beginning, these helicopters were deployed with pylon-mounted machine guns and unguided rockets, allowing them to punish isolated and unprotected enemy formations while carrying out observation, which was in many cases a task greatly simplified by the anti-aircraft fire they received from enemy formations.[6] The fact that they took so much fire made their ability to deliver it right back fairly important – though in the Vietnam era observation was arguably more important, given the paucity of observation and reconnaissance assets capable of discerning targets in the dense jungles of Vietnam.

As intelligence capabilities have grown exponentially, however, especially towards the end of Iraq and beginning of the surge in Afghanistan,[7] the necessity of having a manned helicopter to gather intelligence has diminished significantly. This necessity is diminished especially when one considers that the Army’s OH-58 Kiowa helicopters are relatively slow, vulnerable to ground fire, and have very limited MEDEVAC and transportation capability.[8] What has not been diminished has been the scout helicopter’s ability to quickly deliver ordnance on the targets they discover, given the less-than-existential conflicts the U.S. Army has been operating in. Because of their ability to deliver enough ordnance for most tactical situations, the accounting of operating any heterogenous aircraft fleet comes into play.

The OH-58D Armed Scout Helicopter:

[9]

 

Operating Cost and the OH-58D Scout Helicopter

Pictured below is the operating cost per flight hour of various U.S. Army rotary wing aircraft. Highlighted in red are attack helicopters, in particular, the AH-64 Apache family. The other helicopters are scout helicopters. As one can see, the operating cost of a scout helicopters is at most, one-half of the cost of operating attack helicopters. As a result, intelligent managers of such a fleet of aircraft would, for accounting reasons, fly the AH-64s only when it was absolutely necessary to ensure the survival of troops in contact. It is for this reason that the OH-58D, the mainstay of the Army’s scout helicopter fleet, has been described as the Army’s “workhorse” in Iraq and Afghanistan. Essentially, while Kiowas played important reconnaissance roles even as recently as the beginning of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, their roles have increasingly been turning to that of close air support, and for good reason: cost.[10]

FY15 DOD Rotary Wing Aviation O&M Reimbursable Rates ($/Hour)
Aircraft	Fuel	DLR	Consumables	Depot	Other(CLS)	Total
AH-64A	$411	$3,329	$745	$140	$1,639	$6,264
AH-64D	$411	$3,329	$745	$436	$1,639	$6,560
OH-58C	$73	$408	$116	$61	$405	$1,063
OH-58D	$119	$1,500	$499	$61	$752	$2,931
A/MH-6M	$112	$10	$81	$61	$1,545	$1,809

[11]

Replacing these assets with already-procured ones like the AH-64E and the MQ-1C makes sense, at least in the short-term, given the lack of funding to the federal government as a whole. However, tactically, and especially given that more OH-58s are now being used in a strike role, this poses problems. The first problem is that the MQ-1C typically operates at a much higher altitude than an OH-58, being relatively large and optimized for medium-altitude persistent flight. It is rather difficult to fly a MQ-1C through canyons in the way one can with a scout helicopter. Secondly, compared to an OH-58D, the MQ-1C lacks weapons capability, being only equipped with four AGM-114K Hellfire laser-guided missiles, while the OH-58 typically has seven Hydra 70 laser-guided rockets with an additional .50 caliber machine gun pod.[12] Finally, the MQ-1C is a division-level asset, with possibly only as many as 31 ground control stations being procured.[13]

It is conceivable that these issues of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle might be overcome by other means, but to top it off, the MQ-1C even has the same sensor payload as the OH-58, meaning that given that OH-58s tend to operate at lower altitudes, MQ-1C sensors will not perform as well – and finding the enemy will be more difficult.

Given the budgetary constraints of the U.S. Army, however, such a stance is understandable –especially as it arguably augments the capability of AH-64 crews to protect themselves. If the Army is to resuscitate the armed scout helicopter, however, it should at least consider an “outside the box” solution; that solution being purchasing fixed-wing aircraft.

The Air Tractor AT-802U– or something like it.

[14]

Given that we have established that armed helicopters are going to be used more for strike than for reconnaissance in the future, given the proliferation of tactical UAVs, it makes sense to consider a replacement platform which can conduct reconnaissance but can also destroy targets of opportunity as they arise. The platform which arguably makes quite a lot of sense in this role is the Air Tractor AT-802U. Designed primarily to be a fire-fighting aircraft (but with crop-dusting variants) the Air Tractor has notably been exported to the UAE Special Forces Aviation. It is highly maneuverable, especially at low altitudes[15] and has been armored to deal with anti-aircraft fire.[16] More importantly, the operating and acquisition costs of the aircraft are extremely low (the manufacturer claims $400 per flight hour), it is capable of operating from rough airstrips in forward-deployed positions, and can stay airborne for up to 10 hours – with a 2,500lb payload. Perhaps most relevantly, it has a fearsome array of armaments that can be mounted onboard; twin .50 cal Gatling guns with 2,600 rounds and 2.75” laser-guided rockets being literally the tip of the iceberg.[17]

Naturally, there are downsides to the U.S. Army operating this aircraft. For one, the U.S. Air Force will likely oppose any effort for the U.S. Army to operate fixed-wing aircraft – an idea which has been proposed and successively shot down, with the A-10 ground attack machine.[18] Secondly, while deploying from forward airstrips sounds great on paper, OH-58s can be landed pretty much anywhere; an Air Tractor would need enough space to be undeployable in certain scenarios. Thirdly, even the loss of the minimal flexibility for medevac and transport that the OH-58 does have would be rued by Army commanders, and understandably. But the effectiveness of the Air Tractor in close air support roles would far outpoint that of the OH-58, and in reconnaissance it would be of comparable, if not far superior capability, due to its increased endurance, higher speed, and capability to operate at low altitudes.
Hence, while the Army’s retirement of the OH-58 helicopter entails a loss of capability (especially in cost-saving) by procuring fixed-wing aircraft, they may be able to not only replace their capabilities, but upgrade them. If sequestration were to end, the U.S. Army would do itself a favor by at least considering this route.

[1] http://breakingdefense.com/2013/01/army-still-searching-for-their-holy-grail-a-decision-on-armed-a/ , http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2014-03-05/presidents-fy2015-defense-budget-retires-oh-58-kiowas

[2]http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/April/Pages/GivenBudgetUncertainty,ArmedAerialScoutHoveringinLimbo.aspx

[3] Manned-UnManned-Teaming.

[4]http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/April/Pages/GivenBudgetUncertainty,ArmedAerialScoutHoveringinLimbo.aspx

[5] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/loh.htm, http://www.transportation.army.mil/museum/transportation%20museum/medvachelo.htm

[6] http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20150302.aspx

[7] http://www.bga-aeroweb.com/Defense/RQ-11-Raven.html – Procurement of RQ-11 Ravens is arguably the best example of this expansion.

[8] See here for the extent of transport capability – which might make it slightly difficult to fire the unguided rockets on that platform. http://woolpr.com/wp-content/uploads/bell-oh-58-kiowa-military-aircraft-wallpaper-3-140449.jpg

[9] http://woolpr.com/wp-content/uploads/bell-oh-58-kiowa-military-aircraft-wallpaper-3-140449.jpg

[10] https://medium.com/war-is-boring/drones-and-apaches-are-the-armys-new-aerial-scouts-and-not-everyone-is-thrilled-dbf482f1f897 ; though this example demonstrates that as late as 2011, Kiowas were being used as reconnaissance platforms.

[11] http://www.asafm.army.mil/offices/office.aspx?officecode=1400

[12] http://www.deagel.com/Unmanned-Combat-Air-Vehicles/MQ-1C-Gray-Eagle_a000125001.aspx

[13] Typically, 1 ground control station can operate only 1 aircraft (as the aircraft can be put up into 8 hour orbits for 24-hour surveillance) but the Army’s ground control stations may be able to control 2 aircraft simultaneously. Either way, it is not at all comparable to the fleet size and availability of the OH-58. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness/acq_bud_fin/SARs/14-F-0402_DOC_55_MQ-1CGrayEagleDecember2013SAR.PDF (Page 5)

http://osimint.com/2013/09/10/mq-1c-at-el-mirage-flight-test-facility/

[14] http://i31.servimg.com/u/f31/09/01/13/73/at802u10.jpg

[15] See 2:14 for an incredibly tight turn radius (though, admittedly, it likely suffers from a poor roll rate) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bYv6Y4Qq96A

[16] http://defense-update.com/newscast/0609/news/crop_dusters_180609.html

[17] http://www.agairupdate.com/article_detail.php?_kp_serial=00000326

[18] However, it should be noted that the Army currently operates fixed-wing aircraft anyway, commonly referred to as “funnies”: http://www.janes.com/article/37638/us-army-to-field-king-air-based-vader-special-mission-aircraft http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/01/22/save_the_a-10__give_it_to_the_army_107047.html

Debaltseve – After the Capture

The recent capture of Debaltseve by the forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics has been widely regarded by many commentators as a major defeat and a humiliation of Ukrainian arms.[1] This view, as this post intends to lay out, is an incorrect one. To analyze and assess properly the results of the battle, I will begin with an examination of the arguments for why it was a “defeat” made by commentators. Firstly, they argue that the Ukrainians lost territory which they had expected to hold. Secondly, commentators argue that the withdrawal from Debaltseve was characterized by “hastiness” and ipso facto weakness, indecision, nearly leading to a rout. Thirdly, they argue that the Ukrainians were overmatched and overpowered on the ground, and the results of the battle clearly show it. After examining these arguments, it is worth examining a parallel issue with parsing the results of Debaltseve – accurately determing strengths and losses. Having analyzed all of these, it will then be possible to gauge whether and in what degree Debaltseve can be considered a defeat for Ukraine.

 

The Area of Operations for the Debaltseve Pocket

 

Why a defeat? The three main justifications

As stated before, the first and most obvious justification is that the Ukrainian forces retreated from a position which they were ordered to defend. This is clearly unsurprising. It is uncontroversial to state that it is undesirable for the Ukrainian military, nominally sworn to militarily retaking all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, to lose its only salient into the enemy frontline. However, the physical scale of the retreat, as has not been pointed out by these observers, is relatively limited – only 20km to the NW.[2] As a result the mere fact that Ukrainian forces gave up territory to the separatists cannot be seen as important in and of itself. Realistically, it will only be seen as important if the retreat was brought on by losses, logistical issues, or was a preemptive withdrawal brought about by the concentration of immense enemy strength in the region.

The second justification for the characterization observers have noted that the retreat was “hasty” and seemingly not-planned. Protestations from volunteer battalion commanders of the poor planning have been widely covered.[3] However the commanders of some of those units couple these protestations with demands that that the high command should afford the volunteer battalions a separate intelligence and command structure, a fanciful demand and one which would serve to strengthen these commanders political ambitions.[4] However, while the Ukrainian forces in the Debaltseve salient were clearly withdrawing rapidly, there are genuinely strong military logics as to why a “hasty” withdrawal would be the correct one. The main reason is arguably to ensure that Russian and separatist intelligence was not able to pick up on such a withdrawal.

As has been outlined on numerous occasions, not only do the separatists, with Russian help, have a relatively clear intelligence picture in Ukraine. The high quality of Russian SIGINT is engendered by Russian dominance in electronic warfare capabilities, with Ukrainian secure communications regularly jammed.[5] As a result of this, many Ukrainian units, especially in the National Guard are forced to use insecure communications such as mobile phones. These, being insecure, are then regularly tracked and monitored by the Russian forces including the FSB and SVR.[6] In addition to their sophisticated ELINT, the separatist forces also gather significant human intelligence (HUMINT) from within the Ukrainian military.[7]

Operational security then, is likely to be responsible for the haste of the withdrawal – with inefficiencies within the Ukrainian military itself likely contributing to the reports of tanks and ammunition being abandoned.[8] These inefficiencies are likely to be logistical in nature. Fuel, or the lack of main gun ammunition, would likely be a reason for abandoning tanks given the logistical issues and heavy fighting.[9] With the Ukrainian defense industry capable of refurbishing many more, tank and vehicle losses are arguably not as important as retaining a trained cadre of troops.[10]

The third understanding for why the retreat from the Debaltseve pocket was a defeat is simply a general lack of understanding on behalf of the correspondents. Take, for example, Channel 4’s Alex Thompson, who stated: “Across the day, hundreds of Ukrainian troops have been leaving town, telling stories that speak of just one word: Defeat.”[11] The soldier’s stories that he edits into the broadcast are therefore particularly important. He stated (translated into English):

It was very heavy. We couldn’t even go to take food or water.  Yes, we were urinating in a can all the time we were sitting in a bunker; very very heavy shelling. We were praying all the time and said goodbye to our lives a hundred times; they had really good and heavy artillery.[12]

While this description of “defeat” is harrowing, it clearly differs very little from accounts of successful sieges. For instance, in describing the siege of Khe Sanh, Marine Cpl. Steve Wiese stated: “We knew we were going to be overrun and the whole world was going to end — but that happened every night(my italics). People were wounded and killed every night.”[13]

Khe Sanh, it should be noted, was a siege where the Marine defenders were outnumbered at more than 3:1.[14] It was also a siege in which, while harrowing, Marines killed at least 8 times the number of NVA as they lost themselves. Even while absolutely pummeling their opponents, Marines faced great dangers and tackled monstrous fears while fighting them. Strong opponents and tough fighting are not stories that speak clearly of defeat, however, they are merely stories that speak to the ferocity of war itself.

It should also be noted that this account backs up the majority of the positive accounts of the performance of Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve. The separatists have largely sought to discredit accounts of this performance of Ukrainian troops, primarily by continually iterating that large numbers of Ukrainian troops are surrendering.[15] While these allegations may be politically convenient to spread over the Internet, they do not accord with the reality, which is that separatist forces were continually beaten back by Ukrainian forces. Were the pro-Russian accounts true, the separatists would have completely encircled the Ukrainian forces in late January.[16]

ORBATs

Having examined the first three points we will now examine the parallel to these justifications of why Debaltseve was a defeat: determining the strengths of Ukrainian forces that were in Debaltseve, and also determining the casualties they took.

Understanding the casualties either side suffered is so difficult due to the lack of reliable statistics produced by either side. In the highly propagandized environment, careful examination of the statistics of both sides is necessary, beginning with those of the separatists.

Pro-Russian narrative

Going by the claims of separatist forces, particularly, the deputy chief of the DPR defense ministry, Eduard Basurin, some 3,048 Ukrainian soldiers were killed by the separatist forces.[17] That figure is, as will be demonstrated, extremely high, as will be demonstrated. Pro-Russian estimates of the number of Ukrainian soldiers present in the pocket tended to be in the range of 8,000 to 9,000 soldiers.[18]However, using fairly standard wounded:killed ratios, this figure of 3,000 killed seems fairly nonsense, as it would indicate that the entire Ukrainian force of 9,000 soldiers had been incapacitated through casualties.[19]

If we examine battles roughly comparable to Debaltseve, such as the siege of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War, the wounded : killed ratio for the U.S. forces was 8:1. Using this ratio, for the 3,000 Ukrainian deaths, 24,000 casualties, and a total of 27,000 troops, would be present. Even taking from other more “compliant” examples, such as the 2013 Battle of Bangui, it seems apparent that the minimum wounded: killed ratio in modern combat is 2:1.[20] As stated would mean that 3,000 combat deaths would mean 6,000 Ukrainian casualties – and a completely wiped out Ukrainian force. If this was actually the case, one would expect to see separatist tanks ploughing into Artemivsk right now; the fact that this is not happening demonstrates that the separatist statistics are ludicrous.[21] They also quite clearly play into the propaganda narratives of the pro-Russian governments, which are designed to make Ukraine look weak, fascist and cruel.[22]

Ukrainian narrative

Going by the claims of the Ukrainian government after the operation losses totalled 13 soldiers killed, 157 wounded with 172 captured and missing.[23] Pro-Ukrainian estimates of Ukrainian troops that were present in the salient ranged from anywhere from 2,000 to 5,000 troops.[24] The official Ukrainian figure, delivered on 18 February, indicates that roughly 3,400 troops were present in the salient, given that upon the announcement of the withdrawal, “80%” of the troops were listed as comprising of 2,475 troops and 200 vehicles.[25] That would indicate that there were roughly 3,000 troops remaining after the casualties had been accounted for.[26]

However, while this is presumably a figure backed up by more paperwork than the separatist account,[27]  a rigorous assessment will still be necessary to arrive at something approximating the truth.  In particular, it will be necessary to compare the official figures with the intensity of the fighting and the performance of the Ukrainian forces.

Taking that casualty estimate as a starting point, however, the total listed losses by Poroshenko amount to 448 losses from January 18 – February 18.[28] Given the stated size of the force in the salient, that indicates a 13.2% loss rate. Being suspicious of these figures (justifiably, given the Ukrainian issues with C³, and the example set by Iloviask), it is likely that the loss rate will be higher than this. How much higher though has to be estimated through an understanding of the dynamics and history of the battle itself.

The Debaltseve “cauldron”, “kettle” or “pocket” had been reportedly singled out for assault by the separatist forces as early as 7 November 2014.[29] However, by pretty much all accounts, separatist attacks, when mounted, had been firmly repulsed with heavy losses in their attacks throughout December and January, with regular shelling of Ukrainian positions the predominant means of attrition.[30] In the last week of January, however, the situation on the ground began to change. On 24 January, 2015 after Alexander Zakharchenko, the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic stated that his forces would cut off and encircle Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve.[31]

From that point onward, the separatist attacks were stepped up in intensity. And yet, even though separatist attacks steadily grew in intensity and frequency, their progress was hard-pressed. On 31 January, they reportedly captured Vuhlehirs’k, a significant turning point, as it allowed them to more easily bleed Ukrainian supply lines by shelling the main E40 /M03 road to Debaltseve itself.[32] However, rebel attacks against the belt of towns sitting astride the road the Ukrainian forces – Svitlodarsk, Luhanske, Myronivsky, and Krasni Pakhar, were repeatedly repulsed by Ukrainian armored counterattacks.[33] This belt now forms the frontline of the Ukrainian forces in the region.

Given Ukrainian C³ difficulties, the CONOPS they appeared to adopt – a system of outposts and checkpoints that served as trip-wires for the armored “fire-brigade” worked remarkably well, though this meant that checkpoints often traded hands between Ukrainians and the rebels. Importantly, at no point could it be confirmed that large numbers of Ukrainian troops were lost to single enemy actions. That being said, in the aftermath of the capture of Debaltseve, approximately 100 Ukrainian captured servicemen were displayed by the separatists, though it does not appear that these prisoners necessarily surrendered en masse. [34] Due to its trumpeting by separatist forces it is likely the most substantial single loss suffered in the Debaltseve salient.

Given this reading of the battle how are we to modify the loss rate given the reluctance or incapability of the Ukrainian side to fully disclose accurate figures or estimates? The 13% loss rate seems low based on the relatively high tempo of Ukrainian operations, outlined above, the numerical superiority of the opposition,[35]  length of time of actual operations,[36] and the Ukrainian penchant for deflating the numbers of killed and wounded, demonstrated most dramatically in the debacle at Iloviask.[37]

The rate is likely to be higher than that, though not much higher – as the haste of the withdrawal and the ineffectiveness of the enemy’s artillery in producing casualties against prepared Ukrainian positions would indicate. A fair estimate for a loss rate would likely be roughly 20% of the available units, or roughly 1.5 times the stated number. This higher rate takes into account the additional 100 Ukrainians captured, losses incurred before the arbitrary 18 January starting point, and the “fudge factor” which the current figures are likely incorporating, to contribute to the reputations and careers of officers in the Ukrainian military. [38]As a result of this rate, the numbers of losses would range from 700 to 1,000 men lost, depending on the size of the force that was in fact deployed.[39]

Defeat or draw?

With that estimate of losses in mind, can the Battle of Debaltseve be regarded as a crushing defeat for Ukrainian arms? I would suggest not but due to the retreat and likely significant casualties, it is clearly not a victory for the Ukrainians. Rather than being seen as a defeat though, it would make sense to see the battle for Debaltseve, at least tactically, as a draw. The Ukrainians extracted the majority of their force out against a stronger force that had it surrounded on three sides; the forces in the pocket generally fought hard and well against the separatist forces, in all but the most die-hard separatist accounts, and did so with significant logistical shortages and little to no air support.

Why the loss of Debaltseve is so troubling is not because of what actually happened on the battlefield, but what the relentlessness of the separatists, and Russian forces on the ground indicates. With Russian forces and support on the ground, Ukraine will find it hard-pressed to launch offensives strong enough to sweep back the separatists as they were able to do last summer before the disaster at Iloviask. While the Ukrainians acquitted themselves well in these defensive battles for Debaltseve, matching even the Russian forces at times, they needed a battlefield victory to garner support for their domestic and international political agenda. The retreat showed them incapable of doing this. In this environment, efforts at peace and ceasefire do make sense – but as Putin, Zakharchenko and Plotnizky have ruthlessly demonstrated in Debaltseve, both sides have to voluntarily submit to peace efforts. The lesson of Debaltseve, then, is that in spite of the valiant efforts of the Ukrainian forces, and European diplomats peace will take hold only once both forces have been literally stopped in their tracks.

[1] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/18/ukrainian-soldiers-share-horrors-of-debaltseve-battle-after-stinging-defeat

[2] http://www.kentucky.com/2015/02/17/3698726/ukraine-army-rebels-miss-deadline.html

[3] http://www.unian.info/war/1046294-western-journalists-cast-doubt-on-general-staffs-debaltseve-pull-out-casualties-reports.html, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43549&cHash=abfe364b97c12ad22bcb169643907066#.VO1LYPnF98E

[4] This last point is a plain reason why this accusation should necessarily be viewed with suspicion, especially as the proposal for a separate command and intelligence apparatus was rejected out of hand by many of the volunteer battalions. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TN5umzhOj9E, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31552773, http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/877051-Semenchenko-i-Jarosh-sozdali-genshtab-dobrovol-cheskih-batal-onov

[5] http://news.yahoo.com/ukrainian-forces-face-drones-electronic-jamming-us-232953561.html

[6] http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/04/crowdfunding-the-war-in-ukraine-from-manhattan/ v

[7] http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117710/ukraines-army-small-sovietized-underfunded-and-poorly-trained

[8] http://www.unian.info/war/1046294-western-journalists-cast-doubt-on-general-staffs-debaltseve-pull-out-casualties-reports.html

https://empr.media/opinion/analytics/ukrainian-organized-withdrawal-from-debaltsevo-is-questionable – National Guard SF unit received a 10-minute warning for their withdrawal.

[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=as42werbqlk

[10] http://ukraine.setimes.com/en_GB/articles/uwi/features/2015/02/19/feature-01, http://ukraine.setimes.com/en_GB/articles/uwi/features/2014/11/05/feature-01, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2572149/Stunning-images-huge-abandoned-tank-graveyard-Ukraine-machines-come-retirement-tensions-Russia-continue-escalate.html

[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Z1zS-6i3Ig

[12] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Z1zS-6i3Ig

[13] http://www.stripes.com/news/special-reports/vietnam-at-50/the-bloody-battle-of-khe-sanh-77-days-under-siege-1.314627, http://www.legion.org/magazine/216976/siege-khe-sanh

[14]http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/The%20Battle%20for%20KHE%20SANH%20PCN%2019000411000_1.pdf

[15] http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-02-18/hundreds-ukraine-troops-surrender-besieged-town-debaltseve-falls-rebels

[16] https://twitter.com/_darkhours/status/559296247451099136, http://americasdonewrongs.blogspot.com/2015/01/popasnaya-taken-boiler-in-debaltseve.html and many more.

[17] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2959891/Russian-separatists-claim-killed-3-000-Ukrainian-troops-battles-key-rail-hub-Kiev-says-90-forces-evacuated-siege-town.html

[18] http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/02/debaltseve-encirclement-complete-9000-ukrainian-soldiers-trapped-mercy-offered.html, http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150214/1018270783.html

[19] Soldiers have to be alive to retreat in great numbers as pro-Russian propaganda suggest.

[20] http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35937:still-no-answers-on-the-battle-for-bangui&catid=111:sa-defence&Itemid=242 http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/heroes-of-bangui-honoured-1.1749340#.VO1u0_nF98E

[21] In particular both battles were characterized by a heavy use of artillery, resupply and medevac issues faced as a result, and the significant outnumbering of the defenders. Granted, resupply and medevac at Khe Sanh could be carried out via air, but the runway was continually shelled by NVA limiting its operational availability. Similar parallels can be drawn with the E40/M03 road, continually shelled by separatist forces which limited ammunition resupply and medevac efforts. http://www.stripes.com/news/special-reports/vietnam-at-50/the-bloody-battle-of-khe-sanh-77-days-under-siege-1.314627  Afghanistan, a more modern conflict is even more pronounced with respect to its wounded:killed ratio, displayed here at 10:1 http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf

[22] See here: http://rt.com/news/230363-ukraine-real-losses-german-intelligence/, http://rt.com/news/227071-ukraine-troops-hide-losses/. Ukraine is not immune to this propagandistic streak, by the way: both sides have alleged the use of barrier troops (i.e., troops deliberately positioned to fire upon retreaters) to draw parallels with Stalin’s brutal way of making war and to discredit the other side: Ukraine’s propaganda, however, is less vocal and less powerful, because it does not have the broadcasting power that Putin’s organization does, especially in RT.  http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/02/03/russian-barrier-troops-used-during-assault-on-vuhlehirsk-ato/, http://rt.com/news/226831-ukraine-barrier-troops-donetsk/

[23] http://www.timesargus.com/article/20150220/NEWS04/702209956

[24] http://conflictreport.info/2015/02/09/the-worst-case-the-pocket-of-debaltseve-closes-trapping-thousands-of-ukrainian-troops/

[25] http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/32302.html, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/02/19/debaltseve-debacle-put-ukraines-leader-in-jeopardy-and-that-suits-vladimir-putin-just-fine/

[26] Perhaps, however, there were 2,900 as Poroshenko did say that 100 troops were injured during the retreat: http://russia-insider.com/ru/ukraine/2015/02/19/3637

[27] And one with a greater potential for accuracy, given that attackers leave their casualties on enemy-defended territory, not the other way around.

[28] http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/02/20/7059287/

[29] http://www.ukrinform.ua/eng/news/terrorists_announce_plans_to_surround_debaltseve_327047

[30] https://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/soldiers-return-from-gates-of-hell-south-of-debaltseve-373723.html

[31] https://en.informnapalm.org/zakharchenko-declared-attack-mariupol-debaltseve/

[32] http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/247823.html, http://conflictreport.info/2015/01/30/the-beginning-of-the-end-russian-forces-storm-vuhlehirsk/

[33] Additionally, Lohvynove was a town repeatedly contested over (now ceded to rebel control) where Ukrainian forces repeatedly beat back the separatists: http://news.yahoo.com/photos/russia-backed-separatists-drive-tank-near-village-lohvynove-photo-181433164.html en.censorf.net.ua/news/324385/ukrainian_soldiers_took_lohvynove_by_assault_artemivskdebaltseve_motorway_unblocked_mp_semenchenko, http://www.conflict-news.com/fall-debaltseve/

Svitlodarsk: http://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukrainians-flee-frontline-town-under-daily-crossfire

Kransnyi Pakhar: https://twitter.com/gbazov/status/560956348326612993, https://twitter.com/svarun_01/status/568352392183476224

Luhanske: https://twitter.com/Conflict_Report/status/570151160851668992 , http://www.wsj.com/articles/ukrainian-soldiers-describe-difficult-retreat-from-debaltseve-1424281353 , http://uacrisis.org/andrijj-lisenko-28/

Myronivsky: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/no-cease-fire-in-donetsk-oblasts-myronivsky-as-residents-dodge-constant-shelling-380865.html

[34] Excluding separatist reports, tweets and estimates, which, as we have showed, are very unreliable. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dTBGJaRqkU0

[35] http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/02/20/7059287/

[36] http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/02/20/7059287/ – Quoted the

[37] http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/battle-ilovaisk-details-massacre-inside-rebel-held-eastern-ukraine-282003.html http://maidantranslations.com/2014/10/19/yuriy-butusov-ilovaisk-fatal-decisions/

[38] The intra-case comparison with Iloviask is an important one to draw. At that battle, the government claimed 108 soldiers were KIA, but after the investigation conducted by the Ukrainian parliament, that number was revealed to be 241: a factor difference of precisely 2.23. However, by pretty much all accounts, the Ukrainian forces fought much better at Debaltseve. Hence, the Ukrainian military does not necessarily have to fudge the numbers as much – though with propaganda wars almost as important as what goes on on the ground, wariness should be rewarded. http://maidantranslations.com/2014/10/19/yuriy-butusov-ilovaisk-fatal-decisions/

[39] It is arguable that due to the likely better combat performance of a larger force, casualties would occur at a similar rate to that of a smaller force.

The Debaltseve Pocket

The Debaltseve* Pocket

In the early hours of the morning of the 23 January, it appears that the battle for the Debaltseve pocket has begun in earnest. Though the Ukrainian positions in the city have been shelled for weeks by separatist (and likely Russian) forces, attacks against the flanks of these units have not been made until this time. This turning point in the operations of the separatist forces indicates a significant shift in focus for their strategic aims.

As I briefly covered yesterday, this action around Debaltseve is part of a general strategic offensive waged by the separatist forces. Likely bolstered by direct Russian military support (and indirectly though Russian diplomatic and economic assistance), the separatists are looking to push back the Ukrainian forces in a general winter offensive. Based on the accusations of the Ukrainian President, Petro Poroshenko, the strength of the Russian forces present in Ukraine could be at its highest level yet. If true, that also could be a significant driver behind the separatist choice to launch a strategic offensive.

Debaltseve itself is a key objective for the separatist offensive. The depth of the Debaltseve salient into the separatist lines would pose a serious threat to any separatist offensive mounted either from Horlivka or Stakhanov. By turning either left or right, the Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve could cut the separatist supply lines and could encircle separatist forces. In order to pre-empt this possibility, it appears that the separatist commanders have chosen to attempt an encirclement and destruction of the Ukrainians in Debaltseve itself.

[1]

The progress of the separatist forces is difficult to establish, as any information coming out of the combat zone is inevitably tainted by the political divide between the two sides, both of whom are capable at PR and most importantly, contesting the other side’s narrative of the battle.

From Popasnaya to Gorlovka(Horlivka), both Ukrainian and Russian-language sources claim their forces have the upper hand. In cases like Popasnaya, both sides claim they currently control the area, which would indicate that it is probably contested.[2] Within the Debaltseve salient itself, wildly diverging claims are made by the opposite side, with the separatists claiming that Ukrainian units inside Ukrainian lines have switched sides, and that the Ukrainians are in retreat.[3] Contrastingly, the Ukrainians claim that the Ukrainian forces inside the salient are and have been reinforced with additional units and are holding fast against enemy attacks.[4] However, besides the general observation that military activity has increased, certain points do appear to be the case. In particular, the separatists appear to have taken the small settlement of Dolomitnoe, roughly 8-10 kilometers outside of Gorlovka/Horlivka and roughly 10 kilometers away from the main supply road to Debaltseve itself. This would seem to confirm the graphic on the map above as to the main axes of the separatist attacks. However it should be noted that some have claimed there is a broad-front offensive being carried out along the entire eastern flank of the Ukrainian forces in the salient, from Popashaya to Verhulivka. This, however, seems less likely to result in a success – these are likely to be feints designed to keep the Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve in their positions. In that way, the encirclement would have the best chance of succeeding, forcing as it does the Ukranians to stay as far away from the attackers’ flanks as they can for as long as possible. Based on the reports of pro-separatists in the past two hours, Mironovsky, Kransye Pakhare and Luhansk’e, all towns straddling the main supply route into Debaltseve, are all being assaulted by units including the 1^st Cossack Regiment.[5] This, however, is unconfirmed, and the political bent of these commentators means that their words simply cannot be taken at face value.[6]

The outcome of the Debaltseve Pocket remains to be seen, but it is apparent that the noose around the Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve is tightening. Trapping them could lead to arguably the biggest separatist victory in the war. While estimates of Ukrainian forces in Debaltseve range from 2,000 to 8,000, both numbers indicate the critical importance of this battle on the outcome of the conflict between the two sides. Whichever way the battle is currently going, it seems apparent that the Ukrainian forces would do well to loosen the noose and live to fight another day. It is this author’s hope that they do so.

*Debaltseve and Debaltsevo refer to the same place – the difference in the English spelling likely being due to the difference between Russian and Ukrainian translations.

[1] http://dragon-first-1.livejournal.com/

[2] https://twitter.com/Meduselchen/status/559382817952776192, https://twitter.com/VonHenrick1/status/559391290312642560, https://twitter.com/revsoc99/status/559422145739374592

[3] https://twitter.com/revsoc99/status/559422145739374592, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=739_1422193552#jiDA1Hh5DlyqzUO4.99

[4] https://twitter.com/Conflict_Report/status/559371098803159041

[5] https://twitter.com/VonHenrick1/status/559280993975410689, https://twitter.com/pmsxa/status/559433574953545728

[6] https://twitter.com/hashtag/Popasnaya?src=hash

a

Why we should all pay attention to Ukraine…right about now.

Recently, over the past few months, the conflict in Ukraine has slipped from the public consciousness – and for relatively obvious reasons. Even though the fighting has clearly been continued by both sides after the ceasefire imposed by the Minsk agreement in late September of last year, the frontlines have remained relatively stable.[1] But the capture of the Donetsk airport by the pro-Russian rebels (termed the DPR and the LNR) this week, plus recent attacks against the flanks of the Debaltseve salient and against Shchastya, (north of the major rebel-held city of Luhansk) indicate that the rebels, on at least one of these axes, is planning a major offensive.[2] The DPR leadership has even avowed that their strategy will be to push well past the original Minsk agreement frontlines and push the Ukrainian artillery well out of the range of Donetsk.[3] The DPR and LNR leadership has been understandably less vocal about its plans for the two other axes of attack. Even with the Russian support for the DPR and LNR (pegged by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at 9,000 strong this week), it is unlikely that all three attacks will be carried out in earnest – and succeed in their objectives even if they are.[4] However, especially with the situation in Debaltseve, there is a real chance that Ukrainian forces could be encircled and destroyed.

The Situation in Donetsk and Debaltseve

[5]

The Red territory is the territory held by the DPR / LNR separatist forces. The Blue / turquoise locations are the approximate locations of the Ukrainian forces. The proposed attacks launched from the #5 and #6 bubbles are the attacked launched against Debaltseve; the attacks launched at #13 and from #15 are the ones proposed to push back Ukrainian forces from the shelling range of Donetsk. 

With regard to the situation in Donetsk; it seems apparent that though the Ukrainian forces have been ejected from the city, their prospects for regroup are fairly strong. By attempting to penetrate the Ukrainian lines westward, the rebels run the very real risk of being cut off and encircled. The statements of Zakharchenko appear to suggest the separatists will attempt to push the Ukrainian forces back against a broad front, rather than attempt local encirclements on this sector. That being said, this could very well be a ruse, as the successive counter-attacks against the airport by the Ukrainians are likely to have required more soldiers to carry out. Destroying these concentrations, rather than neutralizing their nominal threat to Donetsk, could prove to be advantageous to the DPR and LNR – if they could pull it off.

With regard to the situation in Debaltseve salient, things look decidedly less rosy for the Ukrainian government forces. Any salient occupied by a military force is difficult to defend, and the situation in Debaltseve appears to be no different. Roughly 20 kilometers wide (14 miles) wide, the salient has been under heavy bombardment from rebel forces for weeks.[6] Crucially for the attackers (and defenders) the rail junction at Debaltseve connects Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (administrative regions) with the rest of Ukraine. For the defenders especially, possession of such a junction is especially crucial for their logistical efforts if they are to push back into rebel-held territory. Up until the last 72 hours, artillery duels between Grad multiple rocket launcher systems at their extreme (read: highly inaccurate) range of 25-40km have constituted the majority of the fighting doe Debaltseve. In the past 48 hours, however, the combined forces of the LPR and LNR have begun to attack down highways MO3 and MO4 in an attempt to cut off the Ukrainian forces deployed in a southern semi-circle around Debaltseve.[7] Additionally, evidence has emerged of Russian armored vehicles driving south-west through Stakhanov to reinforce these rebel attackers.[8]

While accurate estimations of the strength and composition of the Ukrainian units in Debaltseve are not known currently, it has been estimated that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers are deployed there. If cut off by the separatists, the pocket of Ukrainians in Debaltseve could suffer huge losses if they would be unable to break out of separatist encirclement. This is a real possibility given the estimated strength of the Russian troops support the DPR and LNR, and also the reduced mobility in-theatre due to weather conditions.

The risk of an encirclement has been pooh-poohed by some observers, but only time – a short amount, that is – will tell whether a major defeat will be handed to the Ukrainian forces in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

[1] http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/02/27/world/europe/ukraine-divisions-crimea.html

[2] http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/01/23/major-ukraine-rebel-offensive-looming-as-death-toll-surpasses-5000/

[3] See here: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/world/europe/ukraine-violence.html?_r=0 and https://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/zakharchenko-vows-offensive-up-to-borders-of-donetsk-oblast-378208.html

[4] Poroshenko’s comments: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/us-ukraine-crisis-davos-poroshenko-idUSKBN0KU1TX20150121. Zakharchenko, the President of the DPR, has alleged exactly the opposite of this. That isn’t necessarily the case

[5] Map sourced from: http://dragon-first-1.livejournal.com/

[6] http://www.france24.com/en/20150123-video-ukraine-military-defend-strategic-eastern-town-debaltseve-pro-russia-separatists/ http://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv-post-plus/kremlin-backed-separatists-rain-death-down-on-debaltseve-377923.html

[7] http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=103_1422029904

[8] http://ukraineatwar.blogspot.com/2015/01/ilovaisk-20-in-making-at-debaltseve.html

The Warthog, the Lightning II, and an Air Force

The Warthog, the Lightning and the Future of an Air Force

The United States Air Force has partaken in its fair share of budgetary scraps over the years with the other services, and with Congress. Many of these budgetary crises have literally shaped the way the US Air Force, and the US military in general, fights its wars.[1] The budgetary crisis going on now between the U.S. Air Force and Congressmen and -women such as Senator Kelly Ayotte over the retirement of the A-10 ”Warthog” Thunderbolt II is no exception. To understand this crisis and to ultimately offer my thoughts on it, we will firstly need to broadly outline the debate between Congress and the U.S. Air Force on retiring the A-10 Thunderbolt. Secondly, the arguments of both sides need to be deconstructed. Beginning with the A-10, that necessitates a proper assessment both of the A-10’s actual design and the effects that design imposes upon the A-10’s operational suitability. That will also necessitate a specific assessment of the history of the A-10, particularly how well it has performed in recent and historical operations and why it has done so. Then, with a proper understanding of the A-10, a comparison with the US Air Force’s available capabilities will be capable of being made. Ultimately, this author argues that while the A-10 is a formidable platform, it is not the platform that the USAF should defend at all costs. The strategic choices of the USAF – and ultimately, of America itself will be weighed after an understanding of the A-10 has been achieved.

The Budget Crisis

As we all know, the 2011 budget deal reached as a result of the debt ceiling crisis legally committed the U.S. government to provide for a “supercommittee” of bipartisan legislators to agree upon and produce a plan of action that would decrease the deficit. When they failed, automatic across-the-board cuts were initiated all across the government, especially the Department of Defense. The U.S. Air Force, as part of its significant stake in the biggest military procurement program in recent history, with its purchase of the F-35A, has not been exempted from this “sequestration”. Because of the size and cost of the overall F-35 purchase,[2] it is “muscling in” on the budget dollars of the A-10 and every other platform in the Air Force – including personnel numbers.[3]

Importantly, because the A-10’s retirement is a possibility brought on by the procurement of the F-35, observers have decided to compare the two platforms directly. This is arguably not a comparison made unfairly, as the USAF did state that upon the A-10’s retirement, the F-35 would inevitably take up some of the A-10’s responsibility for Close Air Support(CAS) missions.[4]

The supporters of the A-10 hinge their arguments on three points: that the A-10, as a dedicated ground-attack platform, has “saved many American lives”, and retiring the aircraft without creating a replacement would “place our troops at risk.”[5] At least as importantly, it has a fearsome reputation  – both with friendly troops, for whom it is a significant morale boost, and with the enemy, who frequently suffer a morale in decline when an A-10 pair appears in the same skies. [6]  Given these arguments, why would the US Air Force divest itself of such a capability? The answer behind the thinking of the US Air Force lies both in the unique design and capabilities of the A-10 and also the performance of A-10s in its CAS mission over time. In particular, opinions on the latter are extremely contestable, and as a result, will need to be presented carefully on my part, which I aim to do.

The Warthog’s Design

As hinted at previously, the A-10 Thunderbolt II was an aircraft designed to complete one mission – the mission of close air support (CAS). It was designed in the early 1970s, at a time when the nation was withdrawing from Vietnam and was unsatisfied with contemporary CAS platforms such as the A-1 Skyraider and the F-4 Phantom. As a result of being designed for the CAS mission, it had several unique characteristics. Firstly, for an aircraft with two jet turbofans, it was remarkably slow with a never-exceed speed of 450 knots. The slow speed of the aircraft allowed the pilot to be better able to see the units on the ground and more effectively distinguish friend from foe, as well as increasing the time the aircraft had on target. Secondly, the aircraft was designed to be survivable – not only were the engines and vertical stabilizers separated spatially (to isolate damage done to individual components) but the cockpit was protected by some 1,200lbs of titanium armor. This survivability allowed the pilot to take heavy ground fire that he would inevitably take while operating in the theater the aircraft was designed for – Central Europe, against the Red Army. Thirdly, and finally, the aircraft was designed with the largest and most powerful Gatling gun ever produced – the GAU-8, which is a 30mm chain gun spitting out 2,000-4,000 rounds per minute. This last point is a particularly important one to consider.

The Warthog’s Capabilities

The first unique capability to the Warthog that needs to be considered and put into context is the GAU-8. While a hugely impressive weapon even today, it is important to consider that in the time in which the A-10 was designed the reliability of the frontline air-to-air missile of the US Air Force (the AIM-7 Sparrow) was so lamentable the missile failed to even launch one in every two firings. In the late Vietnam era, “precision-guided weapons” were not reliable enough to mount on anything but the most sophisticated strike aircraft – a trend that largely continued until the mid-1990s, when production of effective and cost-effective PGMs took off. As a result, any aircraft designer in that era would be foolish to design their ground-attack aircraft around anything but a gun weapon. The A-10’s GAU-8 absolutely reflects this hard-headed sensibility, a sensibility whose logic does not apply today.

The second unique capability of the A-10, of which much has been made by its proponents and detractors alike, is the aircraft’s survivability due to its armor-protected cockpit and isolated flight surfaces. As a recent commentator has stated: “The A-10 was designed to fight in the ultimate of hostile air combat situations, over the forests and valleys surrounding the Fulda Gap, against the crushing force of a westward advancing Soviet military. Basically, the A-10 was designed to fight World War Three and survive long enough to have an impact and what would be the world’s most deadly battlefield.”[7] While an enthusiastic statement, it is unequivocally wrong. The A-10 was designed to provide close air support (along friendly lines) against an advancing Soviet foe. Why have I italicized these two words, you ask? If one’s ground forces are on the defensive, as NATO forces were expected to be, then they would be in friendly airspace – particularly with regard being in airspace protected by their own surface-to-air missiles. The attacking Soviets would, by attacking, be moving out of their own surface-to-air missile shield. As the Soviets moved into NATO-held territory, CAS platforms like the A-10 would be operating in friendly skies against Soviet forces. Even in these friendly skies, the A-10s would suffer immense casualties from the aircraft and  air defenses the Soviets did bring with them, with one estimate being the USAF would lose 60 A-10s a day.[8] So while the A-10 was designed to fight World War III, it wasn’t necessarily expected to do well fighting it.

The Warthog’s Performance – 1991 Gulf War

The Gulf War was, by many metrics, a conflict tailor-made for the A-10 and its capabilities. The A-10 was survivable enough to last against Iraqi air defenses, and it was presented with a huge amount of its favorite targets, APCs and tanks.[9] Furthermore, it was participating in a war where the opposing air forces were vastly overpowered in the air, and who did little to effectively contest the airspace against the coalition. With that in mind, it is interesting to examine the combat record of the A-10.

Firstly, it is worth assessing statistics regarding combat losses of the A-10. Many of the proponents of the A-10 have argued that the aircraft’s superior losses-to-sorties ratio, even while operating at a lower and more dangerous altitude than other platforms, show that the A-10 is a far more survivable aircraft than contemporaries and resultantly possesses unique characteristics for which other aircraft are unsuited. Granted, in spite of the many missions it flew, the A-10 only lost four aircraft during the entire war. However, the aircraft was not necessarily more survivable, mainly due to USAF policy changes throughout the campaign.

After the first four days of combat, CENTAF restricted all fixed-wing aircraft striking targets in Iraq and Kuwait to an altitude of 15,000ft in a bid to get their aircraft out of the employment zone for Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). This was a largely successful policy at avoiding casualties, especially in the KTO, where the Iraqis did not have a sophisticated radar-guided SAM network, except in the north as part of the protection afforded to Basra. For the A-10, which was employed overwhelmingly in the KTO, this altitude restriction helped its loss statistics immensely compared to similar multi-mission aircraft such as F/A-18s, F-16s and F-15Es, all of whom contributed significantly to striking into Iraqi territory which was far more heavily defended. This policy then changed for the A-10 on 31 January, and the A-10s were then free to fly and fight in their favorite four to seven thousand feet altitude bracket. This policy was effective, with A-10s being sent to attack the Republican Guard divisions positioned on Kuwait’s northern border and making mincemeat of them with their AGM-65 Mavericks. However, on February 15^th, two weeks before the ground campaign began, the USAF lost two A-10s in quick succession to IR-guided SAMs – and nearly lost a third A-10, which was only just able to get back to base. Importantly, they achieved these two-and-a-half kills with only eight missiles fired – a worryingly high success rate to the JFACC Lt. Gen. Horner.[10] As a result, the A-10s were limited to within twenty miles of the Saudi frontier until the beginning of the ground war – another two weeks. As a result, the A-10 was essentially limited from operating in environments its proponents would argue it should have succeeded in for approximately for 23 out of 42 days of war, which should serve as an important fact for A-10 proponents to consider.[11]

On a second note, the Warthog’s unique weaponry, the GAU-8 gun designed to blitz Soviet armored columns with its 30mm cannon rounds, is argued by its proponents to be a fearsome weapon which inspires friends and terrifies foes on the battlefield to the extent that the aircraft itself is worth saving. However, according to the authoritative commentators on the air wars, including A-10 pilots themselves, the most effective weapon on the A-10 by far was the AGM-65 Maverick missile, for which the A-10 was practically the only delivery platform.[12] There are identifiable reasons why the GAU-8 didn’t live up to its high expectations – the altitude limitations imposed on the A-10 for the first two weeks of the war come to mind, but the overall trend, suggestive of the dominance of the AGM-65 Maverick, is an important one worthy of investigation.[13]

As an example, on February 25^th, 1991, a pair of A-10s flying six sorties in a single day destroyed 23 Iraqi tanks.  Given that the ground war had begun and that the A-10 was therefore operating at its intended altitude, the A-10 had ample ability to use its GAU-8 in the role its designers had intended.[14] However, the AGM-65 Maverick missile outscored the GAU-8 by three-to-one in terms of kills on that day, earning 17 kills to the GAU-8’s 6.[15] The A-10s employment of the Maverick was, however, an exclusive one; the Maverick was a weapon which was employed by other aircraft, including F-16s, but they had not trained to use Mavericks – the A-10 pilots were the experts.[16] As a result, A-10s were regarded as the second-most effective aircraft for carrying out strikes against Iraqi ground forces – second only to the swing-wing supersonic F-111F, which employed the 500lb GBU-12.[17] However, this high regard they were held in was largely the result of the A-10 pilots’ superior training with the use of Maverick missiles and a deliberate US Air Force policy to mount Mavericks on their wings as a result; not due to the aircraft’s easier flyability at low altitude or its survivability, as would be alleged by its proponents.

 

The Warthog’s Performance – Iraq and Afghanistan

The Warthog’s performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is arguably the most relevant and certainly the most recent experience that A-10 proponents can draw upon to make their case for why the A-10 is so important to have for ground forces. The issue with these wars, is of course they are “messy” and not amenable to statistics about tanks and vehicles destroyed as readily as the previous conflict. I could indeed throw statistics around as CENTAF itself does to illustrate that the A-10 has only carried out some 15-20% of all CAS missions in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2006 – which is an important statistic given the fact that the A-10 is the only dedicated fixed-wing CAS platform in any service (though the US Army in particular is aflush with rotary-wing CAS platforms).[18] However, such a statistic would most certainly not capture the uniqueness of the missions covered by each aircraft, so each CAS platform could conceivably be filling its own individual niche, with the A-10 fulfilling the 20% of missions suited to its characteristics. Given also that these conflicts are recent ones, and thus are emotionally charged, criticism of such a platform’s performance is difficult to pull off. As a result of this, plus the facts that these conflicts do not readily lend themselves to analysis in the military sense, first-hand accounts of the A-10 will be relied upon to illustrate how the A-10s have performed in these recent conflicts.

“The A-10 is the most requested asset for CAS period. The aircraft was built for the job and the pilots were as well. Not only are they good with the targeting pod, but they are fantastic with a pair of binoculars. They can give us LGBs (laser guided bombs) from up high or they can tear up the bad guys at eye level with the gun. That gun is a powerful psychological weapon as well, the enemy knows the distinct “burp” sound and it is very morbid and demoralizing to them when it announces itself. Second to the A-10 the AC-130 is really fantastic for certain applications. After that the menu just gets less appealing. The fast jet guys do a great job, Harriers in particular, but none match the A-10’s unique abilities. It has saved and taken many lives, I can attest to that.”[19][my italics]

As we can see here, key points I would like to emphasize about the A-10 are the fact that psychologically, nothing beats the A-10s gun. The A-10 not only scares away enemy ground forces, but it also boosts the morale of friendly ground forces in a way that only those who have experienced its support can understand. Similarly rated to the A-10 (likely for similar reasons) is the AC-130 gunship, likely because that aircraft has many of what the A-10 has – cannon and guns.[20] Thirdly rated is the Harrier, likely because of that aircraft’s slower speed than other fast jets, as well as the fact that all of its pilots are carrier-rated. The point that I have yet to emphasize is the point about pilots; which is that yes, while the A-10 is arguably the best CAS platform designed, the pilots matter as least as much as the platform itself. Given that A-10 pilots are largely dedicated to their mission of CAS, they are simply better at it than multi-mission, jack-of-all-trades F-16 and F-15E pilots will be.[21]

Onto another instance of the A-10 playing its trade, this time from Air Force Times:

In July, the A-10’s capabilities were evident when two pilots came to the rescue of 60 soldiers during a convoy ambush in Afghanistan. The convoy came under attack while patrolling a highway. They became pinned behind their vehicles, facing heavy fire from a close tree line. The group didn’t have a JTAC, but a joint fire observer was able to communicate an estimated location to the A-10s. “I flew over to provide a show of force while my wingman was looking for gunfire below,” the flight lead said, according to an Air Force release on the mission. “Our goal with the show of force was to break the contact and let the enemy know we were there, but they didn’t stop. I think that day the enemy knew what they were going to do, so they pushed even harder and began moving closer to our ground forces.” One A-10 fired two rockets to mark the area with smoke. The wingman came in next and pulled the trigger on the Avenger cannon. The enemy moved closer to the friendly forces. “We train for this, but shooting danger-close is uncomfortable, because now the friendlies are at risk,” the second A-10 pilot said. “We came in for a low-angle strafe, 75 feet above the enemy’s position and used the 30-mm gun — 50 meters parallel to ground forces — ensuring our fire was accurate so we didn’t hurt the friendlies.”[22]

The points I would like to stress here are that the A-10’s gun can and is used accurately even when close forces are in proximity. This is not a capability that is widespread among CAS-capable platforms. However, I would also like to stress that this is not by any means a new capability, nor is it unique to the A-10:

“USAF tactical fighters pounded troops, tanks, and artillery positions – helping to break the enemy’s momentum. High-flying B-52s put heavy payloads as close as 300 meters to dug-in defenders; circling AC-130 gunships “hosed down” defenders to within 30 meters.”[23]

The year, as keen students of history might have correctly divined, was not 2002, but was in fact 1972. This is the same 1972 in which solid-state electronics were just about becoming integrated in avionics and defense electronics, and the same 1972 in which the personal computer did not yet exist. This is an old capability, and most importantly, a capability which did not begin with the A-10 – nor will it end with it.

What the A-10’s proponents are arguing is simple and elegant – the A-10 is the last aircraft designed explicitly for the purpose of close air support and therefore it can, nay it must be able to, do things that no other aircraft can do. Is it the last aircraft designed for close air support? Yes. Is it possibly the best aircraft designed for close air support? Possibly. Does that mean it can do things in that realm that no other aircraft can do? That is a much tougher question to answer in the affirmative, not considering the psychological effects it has on the enemy and friendlies. Ultimately, as will be outlined, the choice between whether to keep or retire the A-10 depends on the types of conflicts one expects to see the USAF participating in in future years.

The USAF’s strategic options: The $3.7 billion Bake Sale?

Given the budget crunch the USAF is currently under (as are all the services, including the US Army) it is quite clear that no good budget decisions are capable of being made.

Apart from retiring the A-10 fleet, there are several choices the USAF has stated they could make, and there are others that I would like to suggest, which could prove a solution to the problem were the A-10 required to be retired. However, these are cuts which have been potentially linked to the retirement of the A-10 by the USAF leadership.

Retire F-16s [24]	350 aircraft
Retire F-15Cs[25]	51 aircraft planned by 2020 – 179 remaining
Retire B-1Bs[26]	66 aircraft, B-1 retirement has been blocked by the House Armed Services Committee
Retire KC-10s[27]	Several dozen aircraft; KC-10 retirement has been blocked by the House Armed Services Committee
Cancel F-35 purchases[28]	If sequestration continues, purchases will be cut by 17 aircraft in FY2016/17
Cancel purchase of combat rescue helicopters	117 aircraft – $6.8 billion (already deferred until 2019), cancellation expected to be blocked by Congress

 

And potentially others. Other cuts are being made in fleet numbers across the USAF but these have not necessarily been tied to the retirement of the A-10; for instance, the U-2 retirement is being driven by a Congress insistent that the Global Hawk program is preserved by the USAF. However, as a basic student of airpower will know, any of these retirements are high-risk to the USAF’s ability to execute any and all operations. The F-16 and F-15C retirements are troublesome because they retire aircraft required for the defense of American and allied airspace, missions which cannot be carried out by the A-10, and more importantly do so without an adequate replacement – the F-35 reaches full-rate production in 2016 by Lockheed Martin’s current schedule.

KC-10 and B-1 retirements would affect significantly US ability to carry out long-range strikes and to enhance the operational range of existing platforms. Granted, the B-1B is the least useful of the two, but retiring that platform leaves the USAF with aging B-52s which would not be really capable of operations when the LRS-B is expected to come into service.[29]

The combat rescue helicopter program could be under threat, though no one likes to take away assets from combat search and rescue programs; we like our pilots to be rescued, thank you very much. However, while CSAR is a crucial role for US armed forces, it is not necessarily a role that is crucial for the USAF to have on its own, and pooling of rotary-wing assets with the US Army, combined with a smaller CRH buy (the current purchase in 117 helicopters, I believe) may prove to be a smart way of saving money here.

Finally, and last but not at all least, we have the possibility of cuts to the F-35 program. Covering the pros and cons of giving up part of the F-35 buy for the A-10 properly would take a serious word length to complete – and wary of the time I have spent during this existing article, I will not delve into the specifics of the argument. However, the only way the F-35 program manager has pointed out will cut F-35 program costs are more orders – possibly both from the U.S. but also internationally. Given the instability of the program’s future in many potential markets, it seems apparent that cuts to the F-35 program, at least until Full Rate Production is expected to begin in 2016/2017, do not make sense, risking as they do cuts of orders abroad and a real jeopardy to the unit costs of the program. More importantly, these cuts to the F-35 program will have to come now – and they will not solve the problem of an F-35 program eating up a larger and larger share of the USAF budget as time goes on.

The only real way out the USAF has of making a bad decision is to find the money. An end to sequestration is the only realistic way the USAF and all of the other services, especially including the US Navy, can meet their objectives set by policymakers.

A-10 Retirement Alternatives; My Suggestions

Should the US Air Force given up 30 F-35s in exchange for the A-10 fleet, then? No, of course not, because that figure is misleading – it is not calculated for the savings over the expected remaining lifecycle cost on the airframe, which, make no mistake, is significant. What the Air Force should do, and what has been their first priority, has been to end the sequester. Given the expected failure of that course of action, the Air Force has several choices I would like to mark as equal-risk on their ability to directly wage combat operations (if not their ability to support them):

The Combat Rescue Helicopter Program

The B-1B Lancer program

The F-15C fleet

Granted, it seems apparent that at least two of these options would need to be carried out to preserve strike capability alone (the CRH program will likely have a very expensive cancellation fee, and retiring the F-15C fleet early would mean that the F-16 CAPES program (worth $2.8 billion over the program’s life) would have to be undergone.[30] But if the US Air Force were to retire the A-10, I think the important parts of the A-10 program would have to be salvaged – the mission and the pilots.

The ideal platform for pilots kicked off of A-10s would in fact be the F-16. Already the platform operates as a Fast FAC and since 2006 has carried out 33% of CENTAF’s CAS missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. More importantly, those missions were carried out by multi-mission pilots. If the Air Force stands down its best CAS platform, it does owe it to Army and Marine personnel to stand-up a dedicated ground attack unit. This unit would, like A-10 units now, be trained 24/7, 365 to respond to CAS missions and CAS alone. Doing so would not only allow the Air Force to transition the F-35 to its role as a multi-role aircraft capable of winning air superiority and allow for a better division of labor between the F-35 and F-16 fleets with regard to mission roles, but it would also save on maintenance costs, because the maintainers would transition from the A-10 to the F-35 and the F-16 fleet would be split between multi-role and dedicated CAS F-16 platforms. [31]

Granted, this is not the ideal solution given that the F-16 fleet still has some life left in it – that solution would be to task the F-15 with the CAS role given that airframe’s earlier retirement, but the airframes being retired (the F-15C) are air-supremacy-only fighters, and are pretty lousy at CAS missions. Hence, if the A-10 is to be retired, this solution is the only real way forward for the Air Force, at least until someone decides that the CAS mission is important, and worthy of a successor to the A-10, which due to its single-mission focus could arguably be designed to be an even more effective aircraft than its predecessor.

Ultimately, the U.S. Air Force cannot make good choices, choices that are not hard given the current conundrum of being forced to cut $12 billion every year. However, there are certainly ways in which the Air Force can soften the blow – and the creation of a dedicated unit for CAS and ground attack, even without a dedicated CAS or ground attack platform, seems to be a crucial way in which to do so if the A-10 does need to be cut.

[1] For the USAF, this crisis was arguably the one raised by the failure and cancellation of the XB-70 Valkyrie. That aircraft’s unpalatable cost and complexity spelled the end of the manned bomber as the prime delivery system for the US nuclear arsenal.

[2] 1,763 aircraft, worth roughly $194 billion USD at current estimates – though the aircraft will procured to 2037. http://breakingdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/04/F-35-2013-SAR.pdf and http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/us-lockheed-fighter-orders-idUSBRE92E15020130315

[3] http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/06/us-usa-budget-airforce-idUSBRE91516120130206

[4] http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2013/12/can-the-.html

[5] http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/sen-ayotte-to-air-force-get-me-a-10-answers-keeps-secaf-nominee-hold/

[6] http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/sen-ayotte-to-air-force-get-me-a-10-answers-keeps-secaf-nominee-hold/

[7] http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-usafs-rationale-for-retiring-the-a-10-warthog-is-bu-1562789528

[8] https://medium.com/war-is-boring/an-a-10-pilot-could-hope-to-last-two-weeks-against-the-soviets-1ebff9bfa4df

[9] http://www.simhq.com/_air/air_049a.html

[10] See also Hallion (1992) Pg. 211

[11] Especially Tyler Rogoway. http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-usafs-rationale-for-retiring-the-a-10-warthog-is-bu-1562789528

[12] Hallion (1992) Pg. 211

[13] http://www.simhq.com/_air/air_052a.html, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Part I: Operations Pg.260, 279

[14] Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Part I: Operations Pg.279

[15] Granted, these were tank kills, and the A-10s may have also achieved kills on APCs or soft-skinned vehicles which went unrecorded. The analysis of how effective the GAU-8 was against soft-skinned vehicles has not been found by the author, but it seems apparent given the weapon’s lethality, and more importantly, high amount of ammunition carried, that soft-skinned vehicles would be ones most susceptible to the GAU-8’s firepower.

[16] Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Part I: Operations Pg.261

[17] Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume II, Part I: Operations Pg.280

[18] http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/10-aircraft-designer-explains-warthogs-unique-characteristics/

[19] Unspecified JTAC speaking to Tyler Rogoway: http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-usafs-rationale-for-retiring-the-a-10-warthog-is-bu-1562789528

[20] While a nice suggestion, the AC-130 could not be an adequate replacement for the A-10; firstly, there are too few of them compared to the A-10. Secondly, the aircraft is even less survivable than the A-10 given its need to loiter and circle around a target making its flight path predictable. Thirdly, the aircraft is slower than the A-10 and needs more time to reach station (though once there, it has sufficient loiter time). Fourth, the operating costs are higher, though the advantage of such a platform is that it can call down more direct-fire firepower than an A-10.

[21] A-10s have proven their use for FAC missions as well as CSAR missions. They are more than a “single-mission” aircraft, but as any Air Force leader will tell you, they are incapable of the most crucial mission for any Air Force – winning control of the airspace from the enemy.

[22] Quoted in Breaking Defense: http://breakingdefense.com/2013/10/sen-ayotte-to-air-force-get-me-a-10-answers-keeps-secaf-nominee-hold/

[23] Rowley (1976) Pg.1

[24] http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140318/DEFREG02/303180039/B-1B-F-16s-Could-Next-Congress-Blocks-Air-Force-PlanTo-Retire-10

[25] http://www.stripes.com/nearly-half-of-air-force-s-planned-f-15c-eagle-cuts-could-come-from-overseas-1.272303

[26] http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140318/DEFREG02/303180039/B-1B-F-16s-Could-Next-Congress-Blocks-Air-Force-PlanTo-Retire-10

[27] http://www.dodbuzz.com/2013/09/17/air-force-may-scrap-kc-10-tanker-fleet-general/

[28] http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140511/DEFREG02/305110015/USAF-Faces-More-Tough-Choices-2016

[29] The B-1s currently undergo 374 flight hours per year – the B-52s undergo 216 (per airframe). http://www.afsec.af.mil/organizations/aviation/aircraftstatistics/index.asp http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2013/08/16/some-disturbing-facts-about-americas-dwindling-bomber-force/

[30] http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-8825eada7aa2&ID=1441

[31] The Israelis have recently lead the way on showing how to effectively use multi-role aircraft for CAS missions. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140915/DEFREG04/309150012/Gaza-War-Leaned-Heavily-F-16-Close-Air-Support

NATO – In Need of Credibility?

 

The recent assisted disintegration of Ukraine’s Crimea and Donbass regions by Russian armed forces, beginning in mid-March 2014, has raised fundamental questions about NATO’s political-military posture. More specifically, these recent Russian military deployments have the potential to raise significant questions about NATO’s political-military credibility as a deterrent alliance, given the vast disparity of political will between NATO member states for confronting Russian actions in Ukraine on one hand and Russian sophistication in the deployment of armed forces on the other. These questions are especially important if Russian political goals continue to be concerned with the liberation by force of predominantly Russian-speaking territory in bordering neighbour-states. If Russian political goals continue on their current trajectory, Russian-speaking minorities in numerous states could be, as has been the case in Ukraine, used as a pretext for Russian ‘protection’ and ‘liberation’ by force of these regions – regions, which, in some cases, fall under NATO’s Article 5 provision of collective defence. Deterring such acts for NATO will rely upon successful communication of its military capabilities, and political intent with regards to these particularly vulnerable regions.

The primary question, then, is how & to what degree can NATO deter Russian uses of force against NATO member states with Russian minorities? In first answering this question, the NATO member states in question, and the severity of the potential threat posed to them by Russia, needs to be outlined. Then the constitutive parts of a credible deterrent threats; communication, capabilities, and intent, will be used as an analytical framework to assess NATO’s current posture towards the Russian threat. Finally, once that analysis has completed, it will be necessary to make policy recommendations concerning NATO’s response to this potential threat.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO expansion has been steady. Former Warsaw Pact states saw NATO as a protective shield which would allow them to, in the calm of the post-Cold War world, “free-ride” onto the security benefits of having the sole superpower on one’s side.[1] Two of the states that did so, joining in 2004, were Latvia and Estonia. Importantly, unlike other NATO member states, Estonia and Latvia share borders with Russia, these shared borders bring with them large Russian-speaking populations. These populations are arguably large and homogenous enough to warrant Russian interests over them, given the precedent set by the Russian actions in Ukraine.

 

Latvia

Latvia has recently been the subject of vociferous Russian criticism. The Russian language referendum of 2012, (which, if successful would have made Russian the official second language) was strongly defeated. The referendum was arguably a representation of how the country was seriously divided on linguistic lines.[2] For its part, Russia has been alleged by the Latvian Defence Minister in late April that Russia has been using “specially-trained, professional provocateurs” to swing Latvian public sentiment towards the Russian viewpoints, and that Russian military activity across Latvia’s border has increased since the crisis in Ukraine.[3] While probably inflated by the Latvian Defence Minister, the threat is also probably real, given continued Russian pressure on Latvia regarding its Russian minorities.[4]

 

 

Estonia and Latvia have significant Russian-speaking populations on their eastern borders with Russia, in addition to significant Russian-speaking populations within their capital cities Tallinn and Riga.[5]

Latvia and Estonia possess the biggest Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states[6]

 

The Latvian Russian-language referendum has demonstrated the level of divisiveness over language in the Baltic country.[7]

Estonia

As indicated by the charts above, Estonia also has a significant Russian-speaking population, especially in the capital Tallinn and the border town of Narva, the third-biggest in the country, population 63,000.[8] While Latvia has arguably occupied more of Russian attention regarding linguistic discrimination, Estonia is not exactly exempt from criticism. Amnesty International USA pointed out in 2013 that “Stateless people [mostly Russian-speaking] continued to be denied political rights…Language requirements appear to be one of the main obstacles for Russian speakers to access citizenship and other rights.”[9] Putin has, perhaps understandably, habitually included Estonia in his criticism of ‘non-citizens’ in the Baltic states, with the most recent occurrence being in March 2014 in the UN Human Rights Council.[10] Interestingly, Western and international coverage has tended to present Estonian concerns over possible Russian intervention as mild in spite of this.[11] It is clear, however, from the precedent of the Ukraine that the threat against Estonia is rather likely if Putin’s current trajectory continues.

The Nature of Deterrence

Shifting focus to the more abstract level, the formulation of effective (and ergo, credible) deterrent threats by a strategic actor rests on the successful manipulation or demonstration of three different factors. Firstly, strategic actors must possess the capabilities to deter the enemy, secondly, they must possess the intent to use those capabilities against a potential enemy, and finally, they must communicate to the potential enemy the intent and capabilities they possess.[12] In most understandings of threat credibility, the product of these three factors constitutes the overall credibility of the threat – hence, shortcomings in one area or another cannot be overly compensated by strengths in another area. NATO, to successfully deter Russia against military operations in Latvia or Estonia, will have to demonstrate (effectively communicate to Russia) two things: the military capabilities to deal with the sophisticated, asymmetric use of force by Russia, and the intent to use these military capabilities against Russia.

Capabilities

The Russian use of force in Ukraine has heretofore been characterized by the use of small Russian Spetznaz units, carrying out operations that the U.S. military describes as ‘deniable’ – i.e. waged without formal association to the force carrying them out.[13] The tactics of these Russian units include paying off of locals to protest against the government, the instigation of street brawls and violence to foster instability, and attacking government buildings and ministries to gain control of the apparatuses of power.[14] These tactics have proved remarkably effective at undermining Ukrainian government control of the east of the country and offer a strong set of challenges for NATO forces attempting to deter Russian military aggression. Firstly, due to the deniability of the operations, many of these Spetsnaz personnel are difficult to distinguish from the local population – they operate without uniforms.[15] Secondly, they are small in number, and relatively difficult to locate and destroy for Baltic NATO forces accustomed to reliance upon airpower to do their heavy lifting in combat. Thirdly, because of the difficulty of countering Russian offensives with air & naval power, credible deterrent capability is founded on strong ground forces. Because of the weakness of Baltic ground forces,[16] the ground forces of the stronger NATO coalition members, particularly the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, will be essential to constructing a credible threat.

Intent

NATO’s demonstration of intent may also be a difficult enterprise, even if Russian attempts to annex Baltic territory are particularly overt. The reason for this is twofold; popular opinion in the West is heavily biased against military intervention, and that the collective defence mechanisms of NATO are designed to deal with an entirely different threat; the threat of direct and unambiguous invasion.

Popular opinion within NATO countries on military intervention has arguably always been low; the lack of public support for airstrikes in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Europe for US intervention in Iraq in 2003, and in both the US and Europe, especially countries like Italy and Germany over intervention in Libya.[17] However, the level of public support regarding the possibility of military action is extremely low regarding Ukraine: in Britain, only 10% of adults supported “Western” military intervention in Ukraine with a full 65% of adults opposing such an act in mid-March 2014.[18] In Germany, the level of support was only at 18%.for military support of Ukraine in early May 2014.[19] US support was reportedly at 30% in May, but this support is still insufficient.[20]

Additionally, NATO’s collective defence mechanisms (outlined in NATO Article 5) are arguably insufficient to deal with Russia’s tactics regarding the use of force. Article 5 stipulates that an attack on one NATO member is to be regarded by all members as an attack upon themselves, and that each of them will assist the attacked parties by taking “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”[21] This, crucially, is NATO’s fundamental flaw with regards to less-than-overt attacks on its member states: it leaves the decision for national contributions of military force largely to the individual nations themselves. This dynamic has been clearly demonstrated during the only time Article 5 has ever been invoked, in the aftermath of 9/11 by the US against the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. As the primary theatre for deployment of regular military forces against Al-Qaeda was Afghanistan, NATO states’ deployments there were Article 5 deployments. The sizes of NATO nations’ deployments in Afghanistan are arguably a useful indicator of the level of military support unpopular wars can muster from these nations. With the exception of Britain and perhaps Germany, the commitments were brigade-sized or smaller, indicating that a reliance on Article 5 to provide effective deployments of ground forces, especially from European nations, is not necessarily well-placed.[22]

Prudent Policy

Given these weaknesses in NATO’s position, how will NATO effectively deter Russian territorial ambitions?

Firstly, in the short-term, NATO has to deploy sufficient numbers of land forces to support the extremely weak land forces of the Baltic states that would be expected to carry out an operation against Latvian or Estonian territory. NATO has currently deployed 600 infantrymen – this number needs to increase significantly. This does not mean to say that NATO needs to deploy a corps-sized force in the region; but two brigades, deployed defensively, would seem to be a start – not threatening enough to warrant extreme Russian reaction, but capable enough to carry out the mission at hand.[23] NATO’s Rapid Response Force is possibly a good example in this regard, although it may be the case that even this force, modelled off of Exercise Steadfast Jazz 2013, is too mobile to act as a truly “defensive” force.[24]

Secondly, air and naval forces will also need to be present to deter a more overt conventional attack. However, they cannot be relied upon as compensation for weaknesses in land forces; if deployed in such a manner they will plainly threaten Russia rather than deter it. Using tactical aviation, short-range helicopters (perhaps even relying solely on remotely deployed naval air assets) will send a clear deterrent message to Russia rather than an aggressive threatening one.

Thirdly, and moving to the long-term, the Baltic nations need to build up their military capacity, especially with regards to land forces. Air and naval forces are very expensive to procure and the size that the Baltic states would be able (let alone willing) to procure would be too small to achieve a real deterrent effect. Rather, Baltic states should continue to do as they are doing now – rely upon stronger NATO nations regarding air and naval support, because these forces are so rapidly deployable in the event of a crisis. Given NATO’s distaste for military operations which result in friendly casualties, it is, and will probably continue to be, loath to deploy land forces in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. The building up of Baltic forces could be greatly assisted by provision of moderate amounts of military aid,[25] further ensuring NATO’s feasibility as an alliance.

In the short term, the deployment of forces into the Baltics will be unpopular, but if it is not done, then European security could come under real threat from a Putin who will increasingly find himself with nowhere to go but up – or outwards.[26]

Bibliography

[1] Poland joined in 1999, with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia joining in 2004. “NATO History: Timeline” accessed here: http://www.nato.int/history/index.html

[2] Al-Jazeera ‘Moscow critical of Latvia language vote’ 19 February 2012, accessed here: http://www.aljazeera.com/video/europe/2012/02/2012219164922424336.html

[3] Reuters, “Latvia says Russia trying to use ‘provocateurs’ in Baltic state” 25 April 2014, accessed here: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/25/us-latvia-defence-idUSBREA3O1Q420140425

[4] Apparently, Russia has also been sending in pollsters into the east of Latvia to understand Latvian public opinion better: Wall Street Journal ‘In Latvia, Tensions Mount Under Russia’s Gaze’ 5 May 2014, accessed here: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304163604579531713356133936

[5] Business Insider, 21 March 2014 “These Countries With Large Russian Populations Should Fear What Putin Might Do Next” accessed here: http://www.businessinsider.com/countries-with-large-russian-populations-2014-3

[6] The Economist ‘Echoes of the Sudentenland: The Baltics look to NATO for protection’ 29 March 2014, accessed here: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21599828-baltics-look-nato-protection-echoes-sudetenland

[7] Electoral Geography.com Accessed here: http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/l/latvia/latvia-russian-language-status-referendum-2012.html

[8] TheWeek.com ‘The tiny Estonian town that could spell the end of NATO’ 27 March 2014 accessed here: http://theweek.com/article/index/258840/the-tiny-estonian-town-that-could-spell-the-end-of-nato#axzz33ZaMM9Sz

[9] Amnesty International USA “Annual Report Estonia” 23 May 2013 accessed here: http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-estonia-2013

[10] The Baltic Times “Putin: Status of non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia is ‘shameful’” 27 February 2012 accessed here: http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/30668/#.U42t6fldWSo , RT.com ‘Language inquisition: Estonia gets tough on Russian speakers’ 1 December 2011, accessed here: http://rt.com/news/estonia-russian-language-ban-635/

[11] Financial Times ‘Spotlight shifts to Estonia town if Russia tests Nato’s mettle’ 11 April 2014 accessed here: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9f829192-c07d-11e3-8578-00144feabdc0.html#axzz33YmrujVO

[12] Stone (2012) Pg.110-112, 116

[13] The Daily Beast ‘U.S. Eyes Russian Spies Infiltrating Ukraine’ 21 March 2014, accessed here: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/03/21/u-s-eyes-russian-spies-infiltrating-ukraine.html

[14] Phantom Ops ‘Russian Spetsnaz GRU Arrested in Eastern Ukraine’ 17 March 2014 accessed here: http://www.phantomreport.com/russian-spetsnaz-gru-arrested-in-eastern-ukraine

[15] Though admittedly, quite a few of them are dressed exactly like GRU Spetsnaz personnel. The New York Times ‘Photos Link Masked Men in Eastern Ukraine to Russia’ 20 April 2014 accessed here: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/world/europe/photos-link-masked-men-in-east-ukraine-to-russia.html?_r=0

[16] Baltic armies combined have less than 30,000 regular personnel; overall, combined defence spending totals €800 million EUR. European Defence Agency (2012) Pg.2

[17] Gallup “U.S. Support For Action in Syria is Low Compared to Past Conflicts’ 6 September 2013 accessed here: http://www.gallup.com/poll/164282/support-syria-action-lower-past-conflicts.aspx ; German Marshall Fund of the US “Transatlantic Trends: Public Opinion and NATO”16 May 2012 accessed here: http://www.gmfus.org/archives/transatlantic-trends-public-opinion-and-nato/

[18] YouGov.com “Ukraine Crisis: No Good Options” 19 March 2014, accessed here: http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/03/19/ukraine-crisis-no-good-options/

[19] Deutsche Wirtschafts Nachrichten, “Umfrage: Deutsche lehnen Militär-Aktion in der Ukraine ab” 5 May 2014, accessed here: http://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2014/05/01/umfrage-deutsche-lehnen-militaer-aktion-in-der-ukraine-ab/ (Google Translate used)

[20] Pew Research ‘In U.S., Germany, polls find little support for military aid to Ukraine’ 1 May 2014 accessed here: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/01/in-germany-u-s-polls-find-little-support-for-military-aid-to-ukraine/

[21] NATO “Official Text: The North Atlantic Treaty” 9 December 2008 accessed here: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

[22] NATO Placemat 9 September 2011 (2011) Pg.2

[23] Two brigades (using US Army Brigade Combat Teams as the basic unit) means roughly 6,000 troops. The area of Latgale, the Latvian province home to the majority of the country’s non-citizen Russian speakers, is roughly 5,700 mi² and with a population of 292,000 based on Latvian government statistics. Contemporary COIN doctrine, which would arguably be relied upon in the event that uniform-less Russians invaded eastern Baltic regions, has, as a rough rule of thumb, the force ratio of 20 troops per 1,000 inhabitants for a successful mission. For a region of 300,000 people, 6,000 troops meets exactly that ratio. Kozelkag (2009) Pg.12-14, “Latgale: Statistical Region” Accessed here: http://www.citypopulation.de/php/latvia-admin.php?adm1id=LAT, and here: http://data.csb.gov.lv/Table.aspx?layout=tableViewLayout1&px_tableid=TSG11-01.px&px_path=tautassk_11__2011.gada%20tautas%20skait%C4%AB%C5%A1anas%20gal%C4%ABgie%20rezult%C4%81ti&px_language=en&px_db=tautassk_11&rxid=992a0682-2c7d-4148-b242-7b48ff9fe0c2

[24] NATO “Exercise Steadfast Jazz 2013” 31 October 2013, Accessed here: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131031_131031-SFJZ13-Factsheet.pdf

[25] $1 billion USD, 2/3rds of the aid given to Egypt, would double the current level of defence expenditure in the Baltics

[26] Huffington Post “Vladimir Putin’s Approval Rating Has Reached ‘Six Year High’ During Ukraine Crisis” 17 May 2014 accessed here: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/05/17/vladimir-putins-approval-rating-soars_n_5343156.html

China’s deal with Gazprom – Friends Again?

“After a decade of talks,” in Bloomberg’s words, China and Russia have finally signed the deal for Gazprom’s “Eastern Program” gas, a process of negotiation which began in 2004 when Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation(CNPC) signed an initial agreement. However, does this deal really herald the warmest period in Sino-Russian relations since the 1950s? Answering that question will require an echeloned response involving composite questions.

Firstly, what is the content of this gas deal?

The gas deal signed between Russia/Gazprom and China/CNPC is reported to have a total value of $400 billion USD over 30 years (from 2018-2048). The deal stipulates that Gazprom will supply approximately 38 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year over these 30 years. The headline price for the overall value of the contract indicates a price per thousand cubic metres of $350.88 exactly.

The deal also solidifies the levels of investment that Gazprom and CNPC will put into the deal. Gazprom will invest $55 billion into completing the development of the Chayanda and Kovykta gas fields in Eastern Siberia, (See Figure I, Gas production centers 2 & 3) and CNPC will place $20 billion of investment into its own pipeline development.

Figure I: Gazprom’s Eastern Program

Secondly, what matters in the gas deal and what does not?

That is a much better question. The price of the gas supplied is interesting to note: at a smidge over $350 dollars per thousand cubic meter, that price is at the rock-bottom of Russia’s European pricing. While analysts have stated that, yes, technically Gazprom will be able to make money at that price, and Putin himself stated that the pricing would be linked to the price of oil and oil products, it is probably the case that Gazprom’s margins on this project are razor-thin, and that the Chinese governmentand CNPC “drove a hard bargain” in Putin’s words.

Admittedly, if one takes the opinion that Asia’s forecasted appetite for energy, and especially gas, will continue to increase dramatically, simply getting access to the Chinese market can be seen as a boon for Russia and Gazprom, especially given that 38 billion cubic meters of gas is approximately 23% of China’s 2012 gas consumption, itself a quickly growing 4% of China’s overall energy mix.

Thirdly. what can and should we extrapolate from this deal in terms of overall Sino-Russian relations, given the answers to the first two.

So it’ll probably be profitable for Gazprom, but what does the deal really mean with regards to Sino-Russian relations overall? In Zhou Enlai’s opinion, it’s probably too soon to tell. While much of the Western (and indeed English-speaking Russian) commentary has been focused on how much a possible shift this deal represents in terms of Sino-Russian relations, possibly increasing cooperation on a whole breadth of affairs, it might be important to point out a few basic, overriding facts.

1. The Chinese government is not interested in nor approving of current Russian foreign policy.

China’s position with regards to Russia’s actions over the Ukraine is quite strongly not a supportive one. While Chinese media outlets and commentators do not hesitate to also criticize the U.S. for its perceived role in the crisis, the facts remain that the Chinese have been muted on such actions. The reasoning on this is quite simple. Russia’s actions are carried out to ‘protect ethnic Russians in Crimea and the Ukraine’ – overturning global understandings of the boundaries of the Russian state. China’s international priorities are to preserve global understandings of the boundaries of the Chinese state, (with the possible exception of Taiwan, which China needs no international support in its policies for). The two are, currently at least, diametrically opposed.

2. China consumes a huge amount of energy. Russia is the world’s biggest gas producer and exporter.

The deal makes a lot of economic sense; and surely further Chinese cooperation on energy projects can be expected as a result of this deal, especially given their ability to drive such a hard bargain even with Putin there. But where the Chinese do not have outstanding territorial or political disputes with a country, their general approach to business deals is ‘you stay out of my way and I’ll stay out of yours’ – an approach that has arisen time and time again and which directly applies, given that Russia and China have recently (in 2008) signed agreements resolving longstanding territorial disputes. (The Chinese approach differs in East Asia where it has strong territorial interests, however).

It makes a lot of sense for this deal, which keep in mind, has been negotiated for ten years, to reflect quite strongly business priorities and not political ones. Sure, Putin may have tried to time the signing of the contract to “show” to the West his independence, but 38 billion cubic meters of gas covers about 1/5th of Russia’s exports to Europe, which are estimated at  about 170 billion cubic meters per year. Putin will be hard-pressed to turn Gazprom’s attentions away from Europe anytime soon, even if the Eastern Program eventually supplies 60 billion cubic metres of gas as it is predicted to do eventually.

In short, does China’s deal with Gazprom and Putin mean that China and Russia are on the road to a blossoming friendship? While Putin would like to allege so, it seems unlikely given the current trajectory of economics and international politics in the two countries, which demonstrate a real divergence in interests. It is more likely, rather than friendship developing, that the two sides will stay as colleagues.

 

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-21/tumbling-gas-prices-signal-europe-is-stuck-with-russia.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7517380.stm

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-21/russia-signs-china-gas-deal-after-decade-of-talks.html

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d9a8b800-e09a-11e3-9534-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz32LpssDco

http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ch#ng

http://en.ria.ru/russia/20140521/190004220/Russia-China-Ink-Historic-Gas-Supply-Deal.html

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27503017

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-27076190

Highway to the Danger Zone – Ukraine and Russia

It is immediately apparent from even a cursory glance that the situation in Ukraine has, in that eternally cheesy 1980s-era phrase, gone into the ‘Danger Zone”. Unlike the Tony Scott movie from which that phrase was borne, however, Ukraine’s trajectory does not seem so predetermined towards success. In addition, it’s not a situation in which the Ukrainian Air Force and its Mavericks will be able to dogfight out of – for the first time in the 21st century, the spectre of conflict looms large over Europe in an scarcely believable turn of events. Since the beginning of the political crisis in Kiev, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has contested the legitimacy of the pro-EU protesters, calling their protests ‘pogroms’ and labeling them ‘terrorists’ and ‘extremists’. As a result of these protestors’ deposition of former President Yanukovich, Putin deployed approximately 20,000 Russian troops onto the autonomous Ukrainian province of Crimea, sealing off all air, rail and road traffic (Crimea is an island) under the pretext of protecting Russian citizens and ethnic minorities from the Ukrainian government, most of which are concentrated in the east of the country. The mobilization and deployment of Russian troops in Crimea, the northern and eastern borders of Ukraine, and the issuance of an ultimatum to the Ukrainian government is a drastic, but vaguely logical response given the Russian characterization of the new pro-Western, Ukrainian regime.The Ukrainian regime, for its part has stated that it will defend Crimea and the eastern regions, which include the cities of Kharkov & Donetsk. The new Ukrainian administration has also ordered a full mobilization of its armed forces, and has not shown any willingness to back down.

The Political Stakes

The new Ukrainian administration has near-existential stakes (if reports of Russian deployment on Ukraine’s northern border are to be believed), and has been backed into a corner by Putin’s administration. Putin’s stakes are lower, but from a domestic perspective, it will be hugely embarrassing for him if he backs down; though the stakes are not as immediately existential from the outside as they are for Yatseniuk’s administration. As a result of the high levels of commitment of the two sides, a serious conflagration seems to be in the works. What will not occur as a result of this crisis will be an intervention by NATO and “WWIII”. However, while the strongest efforts are being made to bring Putin to the negotiating table, military action by Russia would be a fairly uncontroversial outcome were it to occur; the question is regarding what military options Putin possesses.

Low-Risk Options
Roughly speaking, there are two broad strategic military options for Russia: Low-risk options and high-risk options. Low-risk options for Putin involve limited objectives, given the action he has already taken. For example, the lowest-risk option Putin has currently is to do nothing more than annex Crimea. Russia has already sealed it off from the rest of Ukraine and being a majority-Russian province anyway, Russia is currently delivering a fait accompli to Ukraine over the control of the province. Another low-risk option Putin has would be to move his forces quickly into majority-Russian cities close to the eastern border, such as Kharkov, Donetsk, and Luhansk’a. The distances involved are relatively short, and civilian resistance is expected to be low. In addition, from a military standpoint, it would be very difficult given Ukraine’s numerical inferiority to put up a sufficient defense in the short-term.

High-Risk Options
High-risk strategic military options are essentially any possible military scenarios except those mentioned above. Given the current Russian deployments, that leaves two likely high-risk options. The first, (and this is one which is unlikely, but possible) would be for the Russian military to drive on Kiev itself. This is a risky venture for several reasons: 1. Kiev is not a pro-Russian city or land – it will be strongly defended. 2. Once the Russians cross the border (in Chernihiv Oblast) they will immediately reveal their aim to be Kiev, permitting a Ukrainian counter-concentration. The second option would be to invade and break off the pro-Russian eastern portion of Ukraine through capturing the border cities specified in the low-risk scenario and pushing westward until a line had been drawn North to South roughly from Kharkov to the Black Sea. This option is risky because the sheer amount of territory being taken is simply massive and the large population means that blowback from ethnic Ukrainian minorities in this area is not only likely but probable. The two options could be combined in this case, but that would indicate a full-scale war, an operation which would meet with severe responses from the rest of the world.

Conclusions
This final note leads into the final point, which is that while I have classified some of Putin’s military options as low-risk, that classification is contingent on all the elements involved in this equation performing as expected. Putin may find that Ukrainian forces on Crimea do not surrender as expected and in fact fight to the death, bleeding the strength of Russian forces there. Putin may find that the drive to Kiev and through the East goes remarkably well, but that the Ukrainian people start a guerrilla war which eventually pushes the Russian forces back to Russia. In the long-term, predicting the responses of Putin’s foes will not be easy, but given the current level of commitment shown by Yatseniuk’s administration, one would expect Russian luck to hold only so far against Ukrainian determination.